

think encouraged or led the Soviets to sign this treaty. We have already discussed many of the other reasons. All of the witnesses but one appearing before the committee believe the United States now has superiority in nuclear weapons, and that the risks implicit in the treaty are outweighed by the advantages. Dr. Teller would not agree with that testimony; but Dr. Teller is Dr. Teller. His testimony is there for the Senator to see. But all the other witnesses, of equal reputation and capacity, testified directly to the contrary.

The committee was assured that the executive branch intends to maintain our superiority by intensive underground testing programs; by maintaining the vitality of our weapons laboratories; by remaining in a high state of readiness to test in the atmosphere in the event of violations; and by improving the various systems by which the United States can detect and identify the nuclear activities of other powers.

The President's letter, which the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] read today, reaffirms, at least from the highest authority, the statements made before the committee.

A great deal has been said with regard to the moratorium on testing. It is well to remember the record on this point, because it has been somewhat misunderstood.

In March 1958, the Soviet Union announced a moratorium on nuclear testing, provided the Western Powers did not test.

In August of 1958, foreseeing the end of our own test series, President Eisenhower announced our willingness to suspend tests for 1 year.

These were unilateral statements. They were not treaties. They were not formal agreements. One side made a statement. President Eisenhower announced our willingness to suspend tests for 1 year, beginning on October 31, if the Soviets agreed to do likewise. We conducted tests through the end of October. The Soviets tested on November 1 and 2, and then stopped. That was all they tested. President Eisenhower said those tests freed us from our pledge, but that we would continue the suspension "for the time being."

In 1959, the Soviet Government said again it would not test unless the Western Powers did so first.

In December 1959, President Eisenhower said the United States considered itself "free to resume nuclear weapons testing," subject to advance notification of such intention.

France, which is a Western power, began testing in 1960. She had not been under any commitment. There were statements by our Government, our President; but France had not made any such agreement, so she considered herself free.

The Soviet Government declared that the continuance of tests by France might compel the Soviet Union to resume tests. There were no further tests by France before the Soviet Union began testing again on September 1, 1961.

This is quite different from a formal treaty not to test. These were exchanges of intentions.

Thus, no formal agreement existed. It was merely a de facto suspension, which was broken by the Soviet Union, after long preparations. However, the United States had not stopped working on nuclear weapons. There was testimony that our laboratories were maintained in a high state of efficiency. The staffs of the laboratories were increased during this period. We obviously must have been making some preparations for resumption of tests underground, because it was only 2 weeks after the Russians started testing and broke the moratorium that we conducted our first test.

It is too bad that the Russians broke the moratorium, as they did, but it was somewhat different from a violation of a treaty.

Mr. HARTKE. Another allegation is that this treaty is the first step in international control by the United Nations. Does the chairman of the committee agree?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I certainly do not. We all look forward to a lessening of the arms race and to diminishing armaments. We use the phrases of "disarmament" and "complete disarmament" loosely. I do not think the committee foresees any such development. Certainly I do not.

So far as United Nations control is concerned, the treaty does not in any way relate to control by the United Nations.

There is nothing in the treaty or anything associated with it, in my view, that could justify any such statements. It is in no way a disarmament treaty. Today there was a discussion of President Eisenhower's suggestions and understanding. It is in no way a disarmament treaty, and it does not in any way inhibit the use of armaments in any way.

It is difficult to answer the question other than to say it is absolutely irrelevant to the treaty.

Mr. HARTKE. Finally, some people fear that if the treaty were ratified, we would not be able to use nuclear weapons in case of war—either in our own defense or in defense of the nations we are committed to defend. I would be interested in the comments of the chairman of the committee on this question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I refer the Senator to pages 5 and 6 of the committee report. I do not believe I should take the time of the Senator or of the Senate to read it all. A nuclear explosion or any other explosion in the event of hostilities is not affected by the treaty. President Kennedy, in his letter, made this very clear.

The important testimony on this question, given by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, among others, was that the treaty would not affect the use of weapons in wartime. It is only a test ban. It is not a ban-the-bomb treaty. In the case of hostilities, either directly affecting us or one of our allies, we feel it is in our interest to defend, there is no inhibition upon the use of weapons.

In fortifying that statement, the Senator will see on page 5 of the committee report, a statement by the Russian Government in response to a somewhat sim-

ilar criticism by the Chinese. I shall read only the last part of it:

Second, the treaty also does not prohibit the Soviet Union, if need be, from holding underground nuclear tests, from increasing the stockpiles of its nuclear arms, and even from using these weapons against the imperialist aggressors if they unleash a war in a fit of insanity.

In other words, aside from what our people who negotiated the treaty have told us, and the President's interpretation, the Russian Government itself has said the treaty does not inhibit them from using the weapons in case of war started by the so-called imperialist aggressors.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I have just posed a series of questions to the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee—questions which have been posed to me by the people who have sent me to the Senate. The chairman has replied with forthrightness, with great sincerity and clarity.

We have, moreover, the assurances of the President of the United States on matters of serious concern and reservations of many of us. Chiefly these concerns are whether or not secret or hidden concessions have been made to the Soviet Union; whether or not we shall lay so much reliance upon the words of the document that we ignore the possibility that the treaty may be broken. The President has assured us that no additional concessions or agreements have been made or implied. He has further assured us that we will continue tests that are legal under the treaty; namely, those underground—and that we shall continue in readiness to resume tests in the air and the sea so that, if the treaty should be broken, we shall not endanger our security.

Mr. President, I believe this treaty serves a purpose. It is a hopeful sign—a slim crack of sunshine in the cloudy skies of world tension and cold war. But we also feel that it is to our advantage and the advantage of mankind.

I view the treaty as a way to cease the pollution of the air, our food and our drink from the poisons of radioactive elements. I believe that the cessation of tests may save infants from death and crippling. Thus, if it is kept for just a day or a week or a month, it will have served a useful purpose.

We must look at the test from this angle. Potentially, it can be a device that may lead to additional concrete benefits for all mankind. Perhaps through this instrument the highest goals and ambitions of all of us for permanent peace on earth may be attained. The treaty itself does not guarantee this. It does not even give us the hope for this lofty ambition.

The treaty will not end the arms race. It may—I repeat—may lead to some moves to limit the arms race. And this, in turn, may help to thaw the cold war or lead to peaceful ends.

But this, too, is more than we can expect. We can just hope.

But while we hope, we must view with realism. The past performance of our adversaries in the cold war is such that they have broken treaties virtually as fast as they have made them. We must,

then, expect this treaty to be broken even though we have hopes that it will be kept and that it will lead to further gains for all of mankind in this eternal quest for peace.

The world is watching. Every mother in our land and throughout the world who has concern for the health of her babies and their babies looks to us in the Senate to help insure that they will not be killed or maimed by the poisons of radioactivity. But just as surely, death is preferable to capitulation to slavery.

But we hold in our hands the vote that can give mankind new hope.

The treaty will not end war or cold war or an arms race. It may not even long end the threat of the poisoning from radioactivity.

Should Russia break this agreement as she has others, the force of world opinion will be mighty. It will come crashing on the heads of the Russians.

But this is not enough. We shall remain ready to resume our tests for we are determined to maintain the security of this Nation and of the free world—forever.

Let Russia take warning here and now. Behind a breaking of this treaty she will find a strong iron fist of the strongest Nation in the world, the mightiest nuclear power—these United States.

The world wants this treaty because it is in the world's best interests. Should Russia break its solemn word again, the world will react.

And the instrument of this reaction will be our own country.

Firm in this knowledge and warm in the comfort of my own convictions that the world deserves hope, I shall support this treaty.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Arkansas for yielding to me at this time.

#### NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY— UNDERSTANDINGS

Mr. DODD submitted understandings intended to be proposed by him to the resolution of ratification of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

#### CIVIL RIGHTS

As in legislative session,

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include in the Record at this point as a part of my remarks an article from Newsweek, issue of September 16, 1963, written by Walter Lippmann, on "The Negroes' Grievances," and also today's editorial in the New York Times on desegregation of Alabama's public schools. The crying need for a standard of law and fidelity to it remains a constant reminder that the price of a slow pace on civil rights legislation in the Congress is to add measurably to the jeopardy to public order and tranquillity in the meantime.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From Newsweek magazine, Sept. 16, 1963]

#### THE NEGROES' GRIEVANCES

(By Walter Lippmann)

Since the afternoon of the march in Washington, the first question in everyone's mind has been whether the demonstration—so big, so disciplined and so moving—would make any difference in Congress. A cool answer would have to begin, I think, by noting that it will be easier for Congress to promote freedom than to provide jobs.

To many of the marchers it is, I realize, a dusty answer to say that their economic grievances are not primarily or peculiarly due to racial discrimination. Admittedly, in the hiring and firing of labor, the chances of the Negroes are poorer than of the whites. Nevertheless, there can be no solution of the Negro labor problem even if hiring and firing could be equalized. For we have a chronic lack of demand for about 5½ percent of the people wanting jobs. With jobs scarce, the problem cannot be solved by establishing quotas for Negroes at the expense of the whites. All that could do would be to embitter race relations.

A real solution can be had only in an upsurge of the American economy which will increase the demand for labor, white and black, by some 2 to 3 million jobs. This will take care of almost all but the unemployable, for whom special treatment, such as retraining, will be needed.

The economic grievances of the Negroes cannot be redressed on a racial basis. They are an inseparable part of the national problem of how to stimulate the American economy—how to provide that much higher standard of life which is within the capacity of our technology, our resources, our capital reserves, and our labor force. Here there is no near prospect of a big advance. In the Congress the conservative coalition opposes the measures which in the experience of the more advanced countries of the world are conducive to rapid and sustained economic growth. To this opposing coalition a preponderant mass of the voters are giving at least tacit assent—some because they agree with the conservative coalition and some because they do not understand the alternatives.

#### HEARTS AND MINDS

Where the most can be done most quickly is in the civil rights measures directed at the disfranchisement of Negroes, their segregation in public education, and discrimination against them in public accommodations. It is quite true that laws passed by Congress cannot change the hearts and minds of whites or blacks, and that the problems of the two races living in the same community will not soon disappear. But it is false to argue that nothing can be done because everything cannot be done. It will do a great deal if the denial of civil rights is outlawed emphatically with the stamp of the authority of the Nation.

The quickest practical results are likely to come from that section of the civil rights bill which would outlaw racial discrimination in public accommodations. For this kind of discrimination is a public humiliation based solely on color. It is a public declaration that the descendants of the slaves are not full American citizens. The victims of this discrimination are for the most part the very Negroes who are the natural leaders of the Negro people. They are the ones who can afford to travel, and it is they who have begun to be part of the American public way of life. They suffer acutely from the stigma put upon them when they want a room in a motel or a sandwich at a lunch counter or a glass of water. This stigma injects poison continuously into the relations of whites and blacks.

#### DESPOTIC THEORY

Of all the grievances, this one is the most blatant. It is also the most easily redressed. It is said, however, by Senator GOLDWATER, for example, that to make it unlawful for the owner of a lunch counter to discriminate is to deprive him of his right of private property. This is a conception of private property which Blackstone described as the "sole and despotic dominion \* \* \* over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."

No civilized society has long tolerated the despotic theory of private property. This conception of property is alien to the central truths of Christendom, which have always held that property is not absolute but is a system of rights and duties that are determined by society. A man's property, says Blackstone, "consists in the free use, enjoyment and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land."

Private property is, in fact, the creation of the laws of the land—the laws of ownership, sale, and inheritance, the zoning laws, the sanitary laws, the laws of eminent domain. It is a primitive, naive, and false view of private property to urge that it is not subject to the laws which express the national purpose and the national conscience—among which have been for a hundred years the abolition of slavery and the admission of the Negroes to the rights of American citizenship.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times,  
Sept. 11, 1963]

#### WALLACE'S DEFEAT IN "VICTORY"

Governor Wallace finally achieved what he had been seeking for a week—Federal intervention. President Kennedy, after exercising monumental forbearance in the hope that the clear will of Alabama's own citizens would make their Governor cease his reckless defiance of law, had no choice but to use his powers to enforce Federal court orders for school integration in Birmingham, Mobile, and Tuskegee.

Governor Wallace thus has his "victory." But at what a price. By his actions, his vain posturings, his cries that he was standing up for the people of Alabama against a dictatorial Federal Government, by his mobilizing of State troopers to spurn court orders and chase Federal marshals off the capitol grounds in Montgomery, he has undermined respect for lawful process and stirred up a devil's brew of racial hatred that can erupt any minute into further violence, perhaps more bombings, more riots.

The unruly students at Birmingham who yelled "Nigger, go home" at fellow students had been given an example in folly by their Governor. The racial activists who attempted to break police lines and paraded in horn-blowing motorcades through Birmingham streets could point to that same example.

Had Governor Wallace accepted the inevitable last week—as the officials and the school board of Birmingham, Mobile, Tuskegee, and Huntsville had done—it is probable that there would have been no trouble at all. Certainly none with which the police forces of those cities could not have coped. Huntsville supports that conclusion. So do all the other southern areas where public school integration proceeded quietly last week.

By his conduct Governor Wallace has degraded himself, his State and its people. And in some measure all of us. He has won a "victory," but the price of victory, as he must have known it would be, is eventual total defeat. Not only for Governor Wal-

ments to which it has been a party. A list of 27 of those agreements appears on page 967 of the printed hearings of the committee.

In that connection I also draw the Senator's attention to pages 132 to 135 of the hearings. At that point he will find a list of agreements, some of which are treaties and some not so formal, which the Russians have violated. That material was inserted in the record during the hearings.

With respect to these documents I should like to make the following comment: While some of the agreements listed on page 967 are of real substance and importance, a number of them are more or less minor in nature. So one must discriminate to some extent in judging the nature of those agreements.

Further, with regard to this list of broken agreements, the Senator will note the significance of the fact that since Stalin's death in 1953 there have been relatively few breaches of agreements. The most important one, from our point of view, relates to the Berlin wall and access to Berlin.

To illustrate how nebulous and inconsequential some of these agreements are, though cited as being significant treaty violations, two of the last four are agreements that the U.S.S.R. had with Yugoslavia with regard to credits and grants. It would be somewhat similar to our agreements in connection with foreign aid. We always consider such agreements rather tentative in nature. We decide that we will do so much for a certain country, usually with reciprocal obligations. Two of those cases are ones in which the U.S.S.R. withdrew or, rather, postponed for 5 years a grant to Yugoslavia of \$285 million. That was a bilateral agreement. I do not believe it was in the nature of a treaty or a solemn undertaking. It was an agreement between those two countries. I only mention that point so that we do not swallow the declaration that 50 out of 52 agreements have been broken, but we should consider the nature of the agreement.

Insofar as concerns solemn treaty undertakings of a dignity and a substantive importance comparable to the one now before the Senate, outside the Berlin problem and since the death of Stalin, the number of treaties violated has been relatively few. Many more of equal dignity have been adhered to without violation. For example, I cite the Antarctic Treaty and the Austrian Treaty. So far as I know, no violation of these treaties has taken place.

These things are not quite as black and white as they appear.

Further with regard to the present treaty, the very least one can say with regard to what distinguishes the treaties that have been observed from those violated—which applies in all cases, I think—in that the treaties that have been observed are those which were in the interest of the Soviet Union. It was for that reason that the committee was concerned in its hearings, and set forth in its report the considerations which, it appears, have led the Soviet Union to enter into this agreement. Insofar as those considerations can be relied on to

be continuing factors in Soviet policy, they provide some guarantee against future violations of this treaty.

First, it is apparent that the 1961-62 tests have led Soviet scientists to believe that in many critical areas of nuclear weaponry they have achieved a rough technical parity with the United States.

Of course, it is speculative as to how they feel, but it is very probable that they feel a certain assurance as to their capacity, which from their point of view is their deterrent.

Second, the Cuban missile crisis is likely to remain in the minds of the present Soviet leadership as a sobering glimpse at the implications of nuclear war.

That point was developed at considerable length, and I believe quite persuasively, by the Secretary of State in his testimony at the hearing.

Third, is the Sino-Soviet schism. The depth of that schism as it is progressively revealed, indicates, I believe, the extent of the commitment which the Russians have been willing to make for the sake of agreement in this case. It seems hardly likely that such consequences as the Soviet Union has already incurred from the mere signing of this document would be incurred for the sake of a document which they do not intend to abide by.

An example of that break was set forth in this morning's newspaper. The bitterness of the exchange between the two countries indicates that there has been a great change in that relationship, and it also has had a sobering effect upon the Russians.

Fourth, the possibility of diverting resources away from nuclear weapons development and into the consumer goods area in which they are solely needed has probably motivated the Soviet leaders. Once the diversion is made it seems possible that this will have a cumulative effect in creating a Soviet Union with interests in other areas than weaponry.

For several years we have heard about the difficulties of Russia in respect to agriculture. It is quite reasonable to believe that these difficulties may have contributed to the Soviets desire to decelerate the rate in the field of nuclear weapons in order to enable them to devote more of their resources to things such as agriculture and the production of other consumer goods.

Finally, there is the interest which the Soviet Union must share with this country in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This interest can only increase with time.

All these things are questions which the committee believes—and I believe—the treaty effects in a way which is in the self-interest of the Soviets. We rely upon such self-interest for the observance by the Soviets of the treaty. It is in their interest. It seems to me that it is quite possible that great countries, with the kind of power that we both possess, could have a common interest in certain fields. These fields may be different. We do not have the same incentives, for example, insofar as consumer goods are concerned, although I think we have a great need in the field

of education, urban renewal, and other things to divert some of the exorbitant cost of armaments to meeting those needs. They are not the same interests as those of the Russians, but they are in that general area.

Insofar as these considerations lead the Soviet Union to enter upon the treaty, they will to a greater or lesser extent, I believe, bind them to the treaty in the future.

In addition to self-interest, some general statements can be made as to the likelihood of Soviet treaty violation on the basis of an analysis of the treaties adhered to and violated in that Government in the past.

For one thing, the greater the number of parties adhering to the treaty, the greater seems the assurance that the Soviet Union will not blatantly abrogate the understanding reached. To date in excess of 30 parties have adhered to the treaty.

While it would not be prudent to predict any change of Soviet policy in this regard based on the personalities of the Soviet leadership, it is noteworthy that recent treaty violations have sought the color of legal justification in place of the cynical statements of Marxist dogma which accompanied the about-faces of the Stalin period. Perhaps the need for legal arguments to support their position will eventually lead the Soviets to conform their conduct to international law.

However, the most persuasive argument for not permitting past violations to dictate our present relations with the Soviet Union on this matter is that a violation in this case will not pass unnoticed or put the United States at a disadvantage. The treaty is self-policing. The United States can safely rely on its own ability to detect Soviet violations and to maintain a military and scientific posture that will assure that no gains will accrue to the Soviet Union from violation of the treaty.

That latter statement is based to a considerable degree upon testimony taken in executive session, which is available to the Senator if he wishes to look at it, with regard to our country's capacity for detection.

Mr. HARTKE. I think I shall do that. I should do it, in all sincerity, for the benefit of my own constituency and for my own satisfaction.

Secondly, many have alleged that the treaty is advantageous only to Russia. The Senator has indicated that there were certain benefits from the treaty to Russia; otherwise, the Russians would not have signed it. It has been said that the Russian goal is to dominate the world, and that the Russians would not agree to a pact which would not aid them in obtaining this objective. I am sure my constituents would be interested in the chairman's view of this question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If that statement has any validity, it could be said about any agreement. To put it another way, no agreement could ever be signed, because obviously the parties who signed it each believe, at the least, that it is to their advantage.

We think the treaty is to our advantage, also. In this particular case, the

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limited test ban treaty is an American proposal, going back to 1959, as has already been stated, and as the Senator knows.

Its purpose is to decelerate the arms race which, if allowed to proceed unchecked and unlimited, would represent a hazard for both the United States and for the Soviet Union. So this hazard faces both of us equally.

I have already given certain reasons why we believe the Soviets can be relied upon to some extent—perhaps to a great extent—to abide by the treaty, because it is in their self-interest. It is also in our self-interest. I think our interests are mutual in many respects with regard to this particular treaty. Many of the reasons why the Soviets will abide by the treaty, which I have mentioned, are also applicable to and relevant to this question. It is in their interest. It is also in our interest.

I emphasize that this is an American proposal by the previous administration, supported by this administration.

It is inconceivable to me that both administrations, together with the vast majority of the present military leaders of this country and a clear majority of the scientific brains not only of the present administration but also of the past one, could all be mistaken in their assessment as to where the advantage lies.

Mr. HARTKE. Many people also believe that the Russians will test secretly. We have heard this in the debate repeatedly on the Senate floor. Many people believe that, because there will be no on-site inspections, we shall be unable to detect such tests.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The on-site inspections, as the Senator knows, which occupied so much of the discussions in Geneva, related to underground testing, which is not to be covered by this treaty. In the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, it is the belief of our best experts—the ones to whom I have already referred—that our capacity for detection is adequate. Not only was this the testimony in executive session, but it was also stated in open session, without going into details.

The director of the CIA; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. Brown, the chief scientific adviser; and the Secretary of Defense all stated in general terms that they believe our detection capacity is adequate to detect any significant violations of this treaty in the environments covered by it.

I think everyone would recognize that there could be tests small enough in size that they might go undetected, but they would be quite small and would not be significant with regard to the balance of power between the countries.

Mr. HARTKE. It is also said that even if the Russians do not test in their own country there is nothing to prevent them from providing a nonsignatory nation, such as Red China, with nuclear weapons which would then be tested under Russian supervision.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That would be a clear violation of the treaty. If it were done, the treaty would be abrogated and

would end. The language of the treaty prohibits such acts.

The signatories undertake to discourage or to prevent testing by other nations, by allies or by any other nations.

That would be a clear violation of the treaty. Our experts have no doubt that we would know that they were doing it, and therefore it would amount to an abrogation of the treaty. We could of course withdraw from the treaty. Section 4 has a very lenient withdrawal clause.

(At this point Mr. CLARK took the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. HARTKE. Another often-repeated objection is that entering into a test ban agreement now would prevent the United States from conducting the atmospheric tests necessary to develop very large yield weapons as a counter to the Soviet superweapons, which are now supposedly 100 times more powerful than the U.S. Polaris and Minuteman missiles, on which our future defense depends. It has also been contended that it would freeze our development of an antimissile defense system; and that, therefore, we must continue testing to maintain and to increase our nuclear deterrent power, for if we do not test we shall lose.

This is also apparently the view which has been expressed on the floor of the Senate by the Preparedness Subcommittee.

I wonder if the chairman of the committee would care to comment upon this point.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There was testimony to that effect, but the great weight of the testimony was contrary to that view. I should say that the testimony indicated the premises of the question are false.

The committee was informed by expert witnesses that the United States, without further testing, could develop a 50- to 60-megaton weapon for B-52 delivery. But these same witnesses assigned very little importance to such a weapon. For example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Taylor, replying to a question on this point, said:

I attach very little importance to this, frankly, Senator. The whole very high yield weapons field is one which has very little, if any, military significance.

I interpolate that as long ago as 1954 this question was discussed by the leading military and civilian experts, and they decided against the development of high-yield weapons. The concept of a 50- or 60-megaton weapon, as opposed to a 5- or 10-megaton weapon, rather loses its meaning, because the 5- or 10-megaton weapon suitably deployed is so powerful as to be capable of destroying any city in the world. That is why the experts did not feel there was any point in going into the extremely high-yield weapons.

General Taylor's comment was supported by the combined statement of the Joint Chiefs. As the Secretary of Defense and these other witnesses pointed out, the United States could have developed such weapons but has concentrated instead on the more useful, flexi-

ble, and deliverable low and intermediate-yield weapons.

With regard to ABM development, the committee took exhaustive testimony, some of which is quoted on pages 12-15 of the report, on this question. The burden of expert opinion is that development of an ABM system sufficiently effective to justify deployment would be exceedingly difficult, if only because offensive capability in the nuclear field is likely to remain far ahead of defensive capability.

Dr. York, one of the leading scientists in the past administration, who headed the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, Calif., said:

The race between offense and defense is a race between a tortoise and a hare and if only the hare does not go to sleep, the tortoise has no chance.

To interpret that, he was saying that the offense can always be kept ahead of the antiballistic missile, or defense, if we are at all alert. Of course we must be alert, whether there is a treaty or not.

But whether development of an effective ABM system is a feasible prospect or not will not depend on testing its warhead, according to Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dr. Brown, and most of the other expert witnesses.

As the Committee report observed:

The United States has a number of nuclear warheads of suitable design and performance for antiballistic missile systems under development. Still others of larger yield can be developed underground. However, the development of a high performance ABM system is a composite of staggering technical problems, largely unrelated to the warhead, a relatively simple and manageable part of the whole system.

Secretary McNamara said:

An ABM system consists of several types of radars, the interceptor missile and the very complex computing equipment at a ground station to control the radars and to direct the interceptor missile. The various radars serve to detect incoming objects in nearby space, to track the incoming warhead, and to track and control the interceptor missile, which is targeted on the incoming warhead by the computing equipment.

That testimony demonstrates that the real problem, the difficult problem, in the ABM system is not the warheads—we have many—but the system that directs and computes, which the treaty does not affect. We can pursue the experimental projects in this field and in experimenting and developing computers and all that goes with them, without the inhibitions of the treaty.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, we all know that the Soviets broke the 1958 moratorium and in so doing gained superiority over us in nuclear weaponry. If they should break this treaty, it would take us several months to resume testing, and therefore they would gain an additional advantage.

What has the chairman of the committee to say in reply to that question?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is true that the Russians obviously learned a great deal from those tests. I have already said that this is one of the considerations we



ments in which testing had been prohibited by the treaty.

For one thing, the Soviets would control the timing and could, therefore, set precise target dates for their series of tests. Such target dates are as important to preparations for testing as a countdown is to a missile launching. The United States, being unaware, as it would, of the time when the abrogation would occur, could not maintain specific target dates repeatedly without seriously degrading both the morale of the personnel involved and the state of preparedness of the United States to test.

On March 2, 1962, approximately 6 months after the Soviets overtly abrogated the test moratorium, and in a period when the United States was still attempting to make its testing meaningful, President Kennedy, fresh in the knowledge and experience of the lack of preparedness in which this country found itself after the Soviets started testing, stated:

But in actual practice, particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep top-flight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain date in the future. Nor can large technical laboratories be kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting for some other nation to break an agreement. This is not merely difficult or inconvenient—we have explored this alternative thoroughly, and found it impossible of execution.

Perhaps the President's recollection of the difficulties we experienced have become dim with the passage of time. I believe the President's assessment on March 2, 1962, was correct. I agreed with his assessment then, and I still agree with that assessment.

If, as the Foreign Relations Committee concludes, the Soviet scientists are confident that in many critical areas of nuclear weaponry they have achieved a rough technical parity with the United States, that achievement is a direct result of the premeditated, deceitful, and sudden overt abrogation by the Soviets of the test moratorium in September 1961. If the Soviets achieved a rough technical parity by such a devious means the first time they tried, there is every reason to believe that they will attempt the same thing again. And there is no reason not to believe that if they achieved parity the first time, they could achieve a clear superiority in technology the next go-around.

Thus, if the Soviets have not already achieved sufficient technological advantage with which to overpower the U.S. strategic forces as a result of their 1961 and 1962 series of tests, or if subsequent determinations by Soviet scientists reveal to them that they have achieved less than the necessary technological advancement to make the risk of nuclear blackmail or nuclear war acceptable, they can always, under this treaty, repeat the surprise abrogation technique and place their bets on another cycle of weaponry.

The possibilities of another surprise abrogation by the Soviets is distinctly cumulative to the military disadvantages to the United States inherent in the treaty. It is in the nature of an insur-

ance policy to the Soviets. The potential for further relative gains in nuclear technology which flow from the surprise abrogation potential, when considered together with the military disadvantages and risks to the United States which stem from the freezing of technology in certain vital areas, characterizes this treaty for the United States, from the military standpoint, as a matter of "heads, they win, and tails, we lose."

At this point, Mr. President, I am reminded of a quotation from a reconstruction of what Patrick Henry probably said at one point in his famous "Liberty or Death" speech on March 20, 1775. The quotation is as follows:

The question before the House is one of awful moment to this country. For my own part, I consider it as nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery; and in proportion to the magnitude of the subject ought to be the freedom of the debate. It is only in this way that we can hope to arrive at truth and fulfill the great responsibility which we hold to God and our country. Should I keep back my opinions at such a time, through fear of giving offense, I should consider myself as guilty of treason toward my country, and of an act of disloyalty toward the majesty of Heaven, which I revere above all earthly kings.

Mr. President, conceivably it could be true under some circumstances, as stated by the Foreign Relations Committee in its report, that excessive reliance on military considerations could undermine the national security. I am not so persuaded, however, particularly in this instance.

The military disadvantages and military risks, as they are so labeled in the context of this debate, are not disadvantages and risks just to our military forces, nor should they be so confined. What are referred to as military disadvantages and risks, are, in fact, disadvantages and risks to the continuation of the one proven method which we have found to prevent nuclear war. They are jeopardies of serious and formidable import to our ability to save the lives of a large percentage of the American public and possibly a sizable portion of the world's population. In the alternative, they are jeopardies of serious and formidable import to our ability to protect the continued liberty of all Americans from Communist domination.

There are no more serious risks than these.

What are the alternative paths to prevention of nuclear war?

Are the alternative ways to prevent nuclear war proven or speculative?

We are told that the principal thrust of this treaty is "political," and that the "political considerations" outweigh the military disadvantages.

The military disadvantages and risks, which are actually risks to our deterrent of nuclear war or slavery, are finite. They are specific and quantitative. They can be numbered and weighed. They are real, practical, and, when understood, awesome.

The political considerations which have been mentioned, have been, at most, vague generalizations, such as references to "peace" and "relaxed tensions." There is no specificity to the so-called

political considerations. At best, the political considerations which we have heard fail to provide any credible means for replacing our finite deterrence as a means to prevent nuclear war.

It is my sincere hope that the proponents of ratification can, in the course of the debate, define and explain the political considerations and aspects of this treaty, and precisely how these political aspects will prevent nuclear war in the absence of an overwhelming superiority of strategic power in the United States.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator is near the conclusion of his remarks. In my judgment, he has presented us with an absolutely masterful analysis of this problem. It is my judgment that the Senator from South Carolina is 100 percent correct in his position.

On the day I attended the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations when the treaty was ordered reported, I did not know how I would vote. But the military aspects of the treaty were not adequately explored, in my judgment, by the Committee on Foreign Relations. If I had to be the Senate's lawyer, and advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty, I would never have voted to report it without having called before the committee Dr. Teller, one of the ablest scientists in the world, to tell the Committee on Foreign Relations in secret session what he wanted to say. Of course, that information was made available to the Senator from South Carolina and his committee, because they undertook to explore these matters.

The Senator well knows that the two great military advisers who have the responsibility to defend this country and to fight and die for the country at the drop of a hat did not increase their prospects for promotion when they went before the Senator's committee and gave their honest judgment about the treaty.

It is my belief that if the decision had not already been made, and if one had asked General LeMay what he thought about the treaty, and had let him study it and reach his conclusion prior to the time the President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, had signed it, General LeMay would have said, "Do not take this action."

I remember when the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee was in full operation, I was a member of that subcommittee. President Eisenhower was in the White House. Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to us, one by one, and each one said "Before you start to disarm this country, you had better let us arm it. We are not well enough armed as things now stand."

That condition has been corrected to some extent. Today the Nation is much stronger than it was at that time. But as the Senator from South Carolina has so well pointed out, the weapons of the future are being constantly developed, and our only security lies in being pre-eminently the strongest—in being first with the best.

I might cite a statement by a man who was once described by General Lee as

being the greatest cavalry officer, to his knowledge, at the time—old Nathan Bedford Forrest. General Lee had never met him, but he felt that General Forrest was perhaps the greatest cavalry officer on either side. He was famous for his simple principle of warfare which, if either side had adopted it, might have caused the war to proceed differently. General Forrest used to say, "Get there fustest with the mostest"—meaning men. Today, the idea is to get there first with the latest developments in weapons; with something superior to what the other country has.

Hundreds of millions of people live under the Communist yoke. They can be twisted by a single command. So we must have the best weapons.

The Senator from South Carolina; the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, who has been a member of that committee for more than 20 years, and is one of the ablest students in the entire world in this field; and men who have the responsibility of defending the country, and who spend most of their time thinking about this subject, have concluded that this treaty could cause us to be placed in a position where we could no longer defend ourselves adequately. For this reason, it seems to me it is our duty to vote to reject the treaty.

I realize that it would be highly embarrassing to the President of the United States in his position of leadership in the world if the treaty were to be rejected. I realize that it would embarrass the President domestically if the treaty were to be rejected. When I voted for the establishment of the Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament, I stated that I was not voting to disarm the United States; and that everything that Agency did would have to be approved by the Senate.

So I cannot in good conscience vote to ratify the treaty merely because the reputation of the President is at stake or the President's prestige is at stake, for I have told the people of my State that I will not vote to disarm my country unilaterally.

I am not going to vote for approval of a treaty which might prejudice the security of this Nation. I believe the Senator from South Carolina has spelled out a case that cannot be answered. I have carefully read the statements of the very able and patriotic Secretary of Defense; and his statement simply does not meet these arguments. He says, basically, that we are very strong. Everyone agrees that we are. But then he proceeds to say that this treaty will tend to perpetuate our advantage. The Senator from South Carolina knows that statement is just eyewash; it is ridiculous. In the area in which the Russians are ahead, we will not—under the treaty—make tests. In the area in which the Russians are ahead with their very large bombs, we have not exploded a missile of more than 15 megatons. The Russians have exploded 57-megaton missiles—three times as large as ours. They have all the information they need in order to explode that large a missile. They have the benefit of a

very complicated series of tests. We cannot make such tests underground. The area in which the Russians are ahead is the area in which they should not remain ahead. But under this treaty, in that one area—now one of Soviet superiority—they will remain ahead, for under the treaty we will bind our hands to so great an extent that we shall find it impossible to catch up in that field.

In the area where we are ahead—in the use of the smaller warheads, we—and the Soviets—can acquire much valuable information by testing underground. In addition, as the Senator well knows, our Nation would not give its word to abide by a treaty of this kind if it did not expect to keep it. Even if we tried to cheat, as an open nation we would soon be caught. A police state, such as the Soviet Union, would have a better chance of getting away with cheating.

However, the Russians do not need to cheat, for they can use China for their cheating. They can explode weapons over the high seas, and then can blame Albania, Yugoslavia, East Germany, or some other country, or can just say that they do not know how it happened, and that they have no idea how those explosions in the South Pacific occurred. So it is very easy for them to be successful in their attempts to lie to us and cheat and defraud us. There are a multitude of ways in which they can get ahead of us in the development of nuclear weapons—and a multitude of ways in which this treaty would prevent us from developing the weapons we need in order to defend ourselves against attack.

Finally we come to the question, are we willing to trust the murdering Communists? The answer is "No." We must never trust them.

For 20 years, or perhaps a little longer, our defense policy has been based on the theory that the way to achieve peace is through preparedness; and before the world we have offered to share our atomic secrets, provided there would be, fool-proof inspection, so as to be sure we would not be victimized.

After pursuing that policy and seeking that objective—which is disarmament, with foolproof inspections—now we are asked to approve a treaty which to a certain degree does amount to disarmament; but insofar as it amounts to disarmament, it would be unilateral disarmament, without the benefit of inspection.

Let me say to the Senator from South Carolina that if this is to be the first step, I shall hate to see the next one, because by steps of this type we would render our Nation incapable of relying upon its defenses.

So long as we remain strong, I believe we shall remain free—but only so long as we have sufficient strength to conduct a successful defense. That is what the very able Senator from South Carolina has well pointed out. I agree with him. Certainly he has rendered a great service in bringing to us the benefit of his wide experience. I sincerely hope that all Senators will read carefully every word of his most valuable speech.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able

Senator from Louisiana for his kind remarks; and I wish to commend him for his fine comprehension of this problem. He has asked very penetrating questions. I hope all Senators will read them, and thus will benefit from them.

Again I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Louisiana for the great service he has rendered.

Mr. President, hypotheses and abstract theories do not prevent wars. If these are what we propose to substitute for a proven deterrent to nuclear war, only heaven can save us. In that case, we can only hope that, in this instance, God will help those who refuse to help themselves.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE] wishes to ask a few questions.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President—  
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SIMPSON in the chair). The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I have the floor. I thought the Senator from Indiana wished to ask some questions.

Mr. HARTKE. I do. Will the Senator from Arkansas yield for that purpose?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. HARTKE. I am sure Senators have received from their constituents large numbers of letters on the test ban treaty. Since the treaty was initiated on Tuesday afternoon, I have received from the citizens of Indiana approximately 4,500 expressions of opinion. These expressions run about 2 to 1 in favor of ratification. In the letters from those of my constituents who oppose ratification, several specific objections are repeated over and over. I have prepared a list of the most frequently mentioned objections. I believe it would be interesting and profitable if the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who has heard and considered all the pros and the cons at great length, would agree to provide some answers to those objections, even though probably in one form or another he has heretofore expressed his opinion upon them.

The most frequent objection mentioned is that there is no assurance that the Russians will respect the treaty, since they have already broken 50 out of the 52 treaties with the West. I wonder if the Senator from Arkansas would comment upon that objection.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I shall be very glad to. I say to the Senator from Indiana that it is clear that the Soviet Union in its short history has violated a large number of international treaties, including such important political agreements as the nonaggression pacts with Lithuania, entered into September 28, 1926, Latvia, February 5, 1932, and Estonia, May 4, 1932, the arrangements for access to Berlin, and the Potsdam Declaration relating to the establishment of a central German Government. However, it should also be noted that the Soviet Union has to all appearances satisfactorily observed a significant number of multilateral and bilateral agree-

Atomic Energy Commission for a number of years.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. It seems to me that Admiral Strauss' testimony is worthy of being considered by the Senate. He stated:

A radical new weapon discovery or a breakthrough in countermeasure systems, suddenly tested and found workable, could put the possessor nation in command of world events.

We ourselves were twice in that position, first with our invention of the fission bomb and later of the fusion bomb.

Mr. THURMOND. The atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Yes.

I continue to read his testimony:

Of course, we never considered making such use of our advantage, but what if in the future the situation is reversed, as well it may be?

Suppose it were the other way around? Suppose the Communists had the advantage, instead of us?

Mr. THURMOND. We are dealing with an enemy whose goal is the domination of the world. There can be no question that the Communists would use the breakthrough for conquest, either by blackmail or sneak attack.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am reading the testimony given by a man who had the responsibility to think about the problem for a number of years. I read further:

For instance, it has been said that the Soviets might elect cheating with a single test which might even escape detection; that we could surely detect a series of tests but that one test by itself alone would be of little significance. This unfortunately will not stand up in the light of history.

We cannot forget, we should not forget, that only one single test proved the atomic bomb, and one test proved the principle of the H-bomb. If such radical invention is made on our side of the Iron Curtain, one that is provable only by testing it above ground, the treaty will firmly bind our hands.

Thus paralyzed, we can only file the idea away in a safe and pray fervently that the same invention will not occur to scientists on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Unfortunately, there is a well-recognized and frequently experienced phenomenon known as simultaneous invention. It may operate against us.

If the discovery—the breakthrough—is made on the other side of the Iron Curtain, is there anything upon which to base an estimate of the situation? Would the Soviets, in that circumstance, or other circumstances favorable to them, clandestinely breach the treaty?

The Senator knows as well as I that if the Soviets should come forth with a fantastic new weapon they would develop it. If there were some breakthrough—certainly we would make some, and so would they—if we should make the breakthrough which would provide, as an example, a fantastically successful missile defense, we would be barred from testing it. We would not know whether it would work or not. We would not know how to overcome the many imperfections which might be involved, or any problems which might develop in connection with it.

Has the Senator the least doubt that if the Soviets made a similar breakthrough they would develop it? Would they not test the weapon to make sure it worked? The simplest way to do so would be to take it to China where, even if we detected the explosion, they could say, "That is terrible. Those Chinese Communists are awful. We deplore this. We are very sorry about it. We have sent them a note protesting it."

For lack of proof, this Nation's hands would be tied.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is absolutely correct. Admiral Strauss was a distinguished naval officer during World War II. Later he served as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in a highly competent manner. He has rendered this country great service. He is a true patriot and a great American. His testimony should carry great weight with the Senate of the United States.

I am very glad the Senator from Louisiana called attention to the excerpt from his statement. I have a copy of his complete statement in my office. I was very much impressed by it.

If we have any new inventions or weapons that might involve or require testing in the atmosphere, we would be prohibited, under the treaty, from testing in the atmosphere, and we would never know for certain whether or not they would be successful until they were tested in the environment in which they would have to be used. The Senator is absolutely correct on that point.

If the Russians developed a new weapon—which they undoubtedly will—from the recent tests, the Senator can rest assured they would abrogate the treaty and test, or test it clandestinely. Their word is nothing. Their goal is domination of the world. They would not live by the treaty. Or they could go next door to China and the test could be conducted on the Chinese side.

So, from any angle we may approach this issue, from any viewpoint we may look at it, all the advantages in this treaty are on the side of the Russians, and against our best interests. The United States is an honorable nation. It will observe its word and will keep a treaty or contract. The Communists will not. The Communist leaders cannot be trusted, and we must not rely upon them.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, it has been said that this treaty is but a small step, the inference being that there will be additional steps.

Mr. THURMOND. That is what I believe the President of the United States said, and it gives me great concern. This first step is far too much, and I fear that if it is ratified, the following steps would be similar.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If a Senator is firmly convinced that the treaty would prevent us from developing weapons we need for our defense, that it would permit our adversary to remain ahead in areas where it is ahead, that it would permit it to catch up in the areas where we are ahead, and that the treaty would be used by our adversary to obtain at least a year's leadtime, in one respect or another, I ask the Senator if we should

not be careful about steps in that direction.

Much as we would like to have some way of living with the Russians, I ask the Senator if this fact does not remain: Our Nation will continue to be imperiled so long as the Communist doctrine of advocating complete domination of the world is the theory and the political motivation of great powers like the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Mr. THURMOND. I thoroughly agree with the Senator. If Russia asserts that it is signing the treaty now to work for peace, let her first show her good faith. Let her withdraw her technicians and troops from Cuba. Let her stop the war in Laos and Vietnam. Let her tear down the Berlin wall. Let her release from behind the Iron Curtain, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Latvia, and the other nations that are now subjugated behind the Iron Curtain. Let the Soviets show some deeds of good faith.

The Senator and I, and every other right thinking person in America, want to live in peace. The Senator from Louisiana, who has fought in a war and knows the horrors of war, does not want another war. Others who have fought in wars abhor war. But the treaty is not calculated to bring peace. In my judgment, it is calculated to bring us war, or subjugation.

Therefore, I think it is clearly not in our best interests to ratify the treaty.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. When the President made his statement about Cuba, which amounted to a virtual ultimatum with regard to missiles there, the Senator from Louisiana predicted, with complete confidence, that there would be no war between the United States and the Soviet Union, at least not at that time, because the Senator from Louisiana was convinced that this country was so very strong, and so well abreast of developments in weapons, that the damage which would be inflicted would be completely unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and that she would not accept the damage which would be visited on her in the event of war.

So long as we are dealing with the kind of people that control the Soviet Union and Communist China, the only real safety will lie in our ability to defend ourselves and in the preeminence and superiority of our modern weapons.

The sooner we recognize that there can be no safety or security in a treaty, and that we must rely on our ability to fight and defend ourselves, the better off we shall be. As Patrick Henry said in his memorable speech, "Gentlemen shout for peace, but there is no peace." A cold war is in progress, and it will continue for a long time. We may as well recognize the fact that the only way we can defend ourselves is to have the most preeminent weapons possible. We hope we shall not have to use them. The only way to be sure of that is to have the best weapons.

I agree with the Senator from South Carolina. The treaty means that now or at any time in the future this Nation would be second best in its ability to de-



fend itself, and would greatly increase the prospect of warfare.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from Louisiana is correct. In my judgment, the only thing that has kept the Communists from attacking us, and the reason for our not having been attacked, is our vastly superior striking power. The only language the Communists know is power. Because of the great nuclear power that we have, and which the Communists fear, we have been able to avoid war. We have been strong.

We are a peace-loving Nation. Unlike the Communists, we do not commit aggressions. We have no worldwide goals or aspirations involving aggression. They are grasping and working day and night to dominate the world. We must remain stronger than the Communists. We cannot do so if we tie our hands behind our backs by such means as this treaty. The treaty would prevent us from gaining the knowledge we need in the higher yield weapon field, or weapons effects and in the development and employment of an antiballistic missile weapons system, it would prevent us from testing our weapons systems and warheads to make sure they are workable. Either one of those fields could prove to be the very thing that would save this country from destruction.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield.

Mr. SIMPSON. I call the Senator's attention to the statement of the President in his letter to the distinguished leaders of the two parties in the Senate. He said this in paragraph 5 of the letter:

While the abnormal and dangerous presence of Soviet military personnel in the neighboring island of Cuba is not a matter which can be dealt with through the instrumentality of this treaty, I am able to assure the Senate that if that unhappy island should be used either directly or indirectly to circumvent or nullify this treaty, the United States will take all necessary action in response.

In the light of conditions in Cuba and the apparent lack of action on the part of the administration, does the Senator from South Carolina believe any credence should be accorded this particular paragraph in the President's letter?

Mr. THURMOND. I cannot see that it should. We were told we were to have on-site inspection in Cuba so that we could say definitely that the missiles and weapons had been removed. That has not occurred.

Mr. SIMPSON. Nor do we know whether or not the Russian military personnel have been removed.

Mr. THURMOND. They are still there, and the technicians are still there in great numbers. How long will we allow them to remain there, 90 miles from our shore? We want to see some deeds of good faith before we enter into a contract that affects our security so vitally.

Mr. SIMPSON. Will the Senator yield for one further inquiry?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield.

Mr. SIMPSON. I attended many of the hearings, both in the Senator's committee and as an observer at the other committee hearings. I gathered the im-

pression from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dr. Teller and others that they were agreed that the Soviet Union would not keep the treaty, and that the probability at this time, was that the Russians were ahead of us in the antiballistic missile field. Did the Senator from South Carolina gain the same impression?

Mr. THURMOND. The testimony of the military experts and of the scientists was to the effect that it is general knowledge that the Communists will not keep a treaty any longer than it is to their advantage to do so. That was generally acknowledged, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff so stated, that the Communists are ahead of us in the antiballistic missile field.

Another potential danger from clandestine testing flows from the possibility that the Soviets will conduct underwater tests in inland lakes in the Soviet Union. If such tests were of very low yield, they would fall below the threshold of U.S. detection and identification capabilities. Even if such nuclear explosions underwater were of sufficient yield to be detectable, the signals received would be seismic, and indistinguishable from signals which would be received from underground tests, which are legal under the provisions of the treaty. There are, of course, no on-site inspections provided for in the treaty, so that verification is out of the question.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I believe both the proponents and the opponents of the treaty can agree that the Communists will lie whenever it suits their purpose to do so. We are discussing a treaty which states that we will not test in the sea. Russia is not the only Communist power. China is a Communist power. Albania is a Communist power. Yugoslavia is a Communist power. Rumania and Hungary and East Germany are Communist powers. We do not even recognize East Germany. Suppose the Communists wish to find out what the effect of an atomic explosion would be on one of our Polaris submarines. They could go out and make that test in a submarine in the South Pacific somewhere. They could do that and lie, "We did not explode that." How are we going to prove who did explode it?

Suppose there is an explosion somewhere in the South Pacific or somewhere near the South Pole, and suppose they say, "We know nothing whatever about it."

Suppose we say, "Who was the awful fellow who did it?" Supposing Albania says, "We did it," just to play the game with the Communists. They can say, "We did not sign the treaty. We did it."

Suppose Red China lies and says, "We did it."

It is standard Communist procedure to lie to us when it hurts us and helps them. Red China could say, "We did it." How are we going to say that a Russian submarine did it? We would be bound by the treaty. One government would say, "We do not know anything about it." Another would say, "We did it." How would we know who did it, unless we were

told in advance? No one believes that they would tell us in advance about an explosion some 500 miles south of Tasmania. They could do that. How would we know who caused the explosion?

Mr. THURMOND. The Communists are known to be guilty of deceit and deception. They will do what the distinguished Senator from Louisiana said they might do. They would not hesitate to do so if they felt it was to their advantage to do it. The Chinese Reds might make the underwater tests, assisted by Soviet technicians.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If we did something like that, a member of the crew would come back and tell about it, and there would be an investigation. Some people probably would want to impeach the President for breaking the solemn obligation of the country under the treaty. The Communists are not bound by any such considerations. It is a part of their doctrine and idealism to act the way they have been acting right along. That is what they believe in. For the life of me I cannot understand how anyone could prove that the explosion was not set off by the Communist Chinese, or perhaps even by Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam. How could we prove who was responsible? All we would know would be that there was a big blast.

Mr. THURMOND. Much could be learned about weapons effects from underwater detonations. Among other things, the vulnerabilities of submarines and estimates of the radius of kill of nuclear devices exploded underwater for antisubmarine warfare purposes could be ascertained.

Currently, our detection capabilities are largely degraded in the distances of outer space. Should our capabilities be improved to the extent which the probable state of the art would now permit, there would probably be little likelihood that the Soviets would attempt to clandestinely test for weapons effects in space. Weapons effects tests require considerable instrumentation and preparation, and therefore, would be subject to detection from normal intelligence, as well as technical detection devices. Proof tests of warheads and total systems, however, require less preparation and considerably less instrumentation, and the possibility of infrequent, but highly significant, clandestine proof tests by the Soviet Union constitutes a distinct risk. The risk, again in this case, is decidedly cumulative; for it could serve to confirm a weapons design which was based on technology derived from the Soviets 1961 and 1962 series of tests.

Of even more serious import than that flowing from the risk of successful Soviet clandestine tests is the potential for a sudden and surprise abrogation of the treaty by the Soviet Union in the form of a comprehensive series of tests.

Despite the promised safeguards, and even under circumstances where the promised safeguards of readiness to test are carried out vigorously by the executive branch, a surprise abrogation by the Soviets would still catch the United States unprepared to test meaningfully and comprehensively in the environ-



early in World War II our naval forces were using torpedoes that would not explode? They had been tested under simulated conditions, for prior to the war, "economize" was the order of the day, and our naval chiefs were unwilling to use torpedoes in actual deepwater tests against ships. So the tests were made under simulated conditions. They were made with deepwater torpedoes. We had not then developed shallow-water torpedoes. It was believed that when the torpedo passed beneath a ship, the magnetic field of the ship would explode the torpedo.

When tested under simulated conditions, the torpedoes worked perfectly; but under actual war conditions they went about 10 feet deeper than planned, with the result that they did not pick up sufficient magnetic impulse to make them explode; and nothing happened.

Some people thought our submarine commanders perhaps lacked the courage to move close enough to the ships to be sure the torpedoes would hit them. Others thought the sailors were drinking the alcohol in the gyroscopic mechanism of the torpedoes, and thus causing them to malfunction. Then it was found that the firing pins of the torpedoes were too brittle, and were not sufficiently viable to withstand the shock of a direct hit. So our torpedoes would not explode.

One commander reported that it was a waste of time and money to send a submarine 8,500 miles, only to find that the torpedoes were no good. It was clear that actual use under war conditions was required.

The Japanese, who did not have that problem, sank practically all our Pacific Fleet. Their torpedoes were designed to work in shallow water. And the British had developed a good one, which they used to excellent effect when they raided the Italian naval base at Taranto.

Developing a contact torpedo is a simple problem. I believe I could build one myself, by reason of knowing a little about fulminate of mercury and TNT. But that problem would be simple, compared to the intricacies involved developing a missile that would be accurate enough to shoot down 100, 200, 500, or 1,000 other missiles. However, to fail in that task would be to mortgage our future survival, because the scientists have proved that these things can be done.

Someone will develop a successful missile defense. I hope and pray that this Nation, rather than the Soviet Union, develops it first.

But I say to the Senator from South Carolina that in my judgment—and I believe it is also the judgment of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee—we shall never have a successful missile defense so long as we abide by the terms of the treaty.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from Louisiana is correct. He was a distinguished naval officer in World War II, and he has very interestingly related the experience with our torpedoes. I believe his illustration is apropos. We must test this weapon in the environment in which it will actually be used, in order definitely to determine whether it will be successful.

I feel that our stockpile of warheads should also be tested, for it is quite possible that duds are among them.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from the Cowboy State.

Mr. SIMPSON. Is not that the gist of the testimony of Dr. Teller?

Mr. THURMOND. Dr. Teller's testimony was to that effect, as was the testimony of other scientists and military experts.

Mr. SIMPSON. I compliment the able Senator from South Carolina for his magnificent exposition. Because of his great ability and his long military experience, he should be carefully listened to by the people of America, I believe history will record that he is entirely correct.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senator from Wyoming for his kind remarks.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I believe I have referred to a certain amount of information which has not otherwise been available to us. Does the Senator share the opinion of General Twining and Admiral Radford—both of whom at one time were Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—that we would not be able to develop an atomic missile defense without testing?

Mr. THURMOND. I am not sure that they expressed an opinion on that particular point, but General Twining testified in secret session and gave us extremely valuable information that was most helpful. Almost any person present would have been convinced by his statement that the treaty would not be in our best interests.

Incidentally, as I stated earlier, General Twining has been with a group known as the Twining Committee, which is carrying on research and work for the Air Force, as I understand. He is probably in as favorable a position as anyone to know what the situation is and whether or not the treaty would be helpful to us. Some may say that these former chairmen or chiefs are now out and are not familiar with the latest information, but this is not necessarily the case.

General Twining has been briefed recently on intelligence. He is informed of what is going on. That is one reason he could not testify in open session and give all the information that he possessed.

Admiral Radford made a very strong statement, which is in the record of the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, and which, although brief, is against the treaty on the ground that it would not be in our best national interest. Admiral Burke, a former Chief of Naval Operations, shares that opinion.

Mr. President, the sum and substance of the matter is that there has been no race. The reasons for the U.S. failure to test more aggressively are difficult to pinpoint, but were political, psychological, and technical in nature. Not the least of the reasons why the U.S. test programs lagged was the state of unpreparedness to test which resulted from the moratorium. Some of the first tests which the United States conducted after

the Soviets openly breached the moratorium were of little or no value, for they were hastily and ill prepared. This, too, contributed to the relative gains in nuclear technology which the Soviets achieved in the past 2 years.

In those areas of testing where the United States has concentrated, the United States still holds a probable lead in technology, despite our lack of aggressiveness in testing. This is the case in the low megatonnage weapons design technology, where we are still ahead.

There is every reason to believe that if the United States tested seriously, after planning and scheduling carefully, without an off-again, on-again approach that has so often characterized the U.S. approach to testing, we could maintain an overwhelming superiority. Our scientists are more imaginative and capable, our laboratories are more efficient, and our military planners more sound in judgment of weapons requirements than those of the Soviets. Our capabilities are superior to those of the Soviets, not inferior. But superior capabilities cannot avail the United States of superior strategic power, and thereby an assured deterrent to nuclear war, unless there is a will and policy for these capabilities to be realized to the maximum. Had we tested to the extent of our capabilities since September 1961, the superiority of technology held by the United States on that date would not have diminished or disappeared, but would have increased despite the comprehensive Soviet series of tests.

The requirements for testing which are listed in the report of the Preparedness Subcommittee are not substantially different in nature than they were in September 1961. Had these requirements been met by serious and diligent U.S. testing in the period since that date, the United States would probably now have a commanding lead in nuclear technology; and a treaty, such as the one now before the Senate, which tends to freeze certain levels of technology, could have assisted in protecting this commanding lead in nuclear technology. As it is, we are in the position of considering a treaty which may at best tend to freeze a rough technological parity overall and freezes a technological inferiority of the United States in certain crucial areas.

In reaching their conclusion that the "Soviet scientists presumably are confident that in many critical areas of nuclear weaponry they have achieved a rough technical parity with the United States," the Foreign Relations Committee was attempting to assess the probable motives of the Soviet Union in now accepting what heretofore it has consistently rejected. While attempts to assess the motives of the Soviet Union are necessarily conjectural and highly speculative, as pointed out by the Foreign Relations Committee, none of the probabilities of Soviet motivations should be excluded from consideration.

The Foreign Relations Committee has omitted from consideration in its report one quite possible, and I am convinced, probable, motive of the Soviets in suddenly signing this treaty. Admittedly, this probable motive is of a mili-

tary nature, which may account for the lack of consideration accorded it in the Foreign Relations Committee report.

It is possible, even probable, that the Soviet scientists have concluded, as a result of the series of tests conducted by the Soviets in 1961 and 1962, that they have achieved a technological breakthrough in discovering vulnerabilities in the U.S. strategic nuclear force and in learning enough about multimegaton weapon design to exploit those vulnerabilities. The vulnerability which they may have concluded that they have discovered may pertain solely to some feature of our missiles in silos, or in the circuitry which controls the launching or guidance of the missile. Such vulnerability could be in the warheads. There is such a large area of lack of knowledge in the United States, and the Soviet tests were sufficiently comprehensive, that the vulnerability could lie in any one of a number of areas. It could be in our missile control circuits, or in our warning system. The means to exploit such a vulnerability could lie in the very size of the blast or in the shock effects of their monster bomb, for which they have the technology to produce delivery vehicles. If they do not now have the vehicles themselves. The means of exploiting the vulnerability could well lie in the exotic effects produced by the 100-megaton bomb.

If the Soviets have achieved a technological breakthrough by which they could produce weapons to neutralize or destroy our land-based missile force, they would, of course, still have to deal with the Polaris system. This is where even a less than perfect ABM system could contribute substantially to downgrading the credibility of the U.S. second strike force. One of the principal problems in ABM development is providing a capability of dealing with saturation attacks. A relatively unsophisticated ABM system can be very effective against single missiles fired at single targets. The Polaris system does not fire salvos. There can be no simultaneous saturation attack on a large number of targets by a Polaris system. Even if the Polaris carried up to five warheads on each missile, an ABM system of limited capability could provide a substantial and highly effective defense. If Soviet detection and counterfire capabilities have also been substantially improved, they might be persuaded that the Polaris submarine could be knocked out before many of its missiles were launched. We do not have much knowledge on the radius of kill of a multimegaton weapon when employed against a submarine.

If, indeed, the Soviets achieved such knowledge from their 1961 and 1962 series of tests, they would still have a problem, of course. There is always a chance, in the absence of a test ban treaty, that the United States would test and discover knowledge which could be used to remove vulnerabilities in our systems and design new counterweapons. The relative Soviet productive capacity is so poor, that even if the United States obtained the pertinent and needed information 2 years after the Soviets—say in 1965—there would be a distinct possi-

bility that the United States, through its superior production, could correct the vulnerabilities in its weapons systems and deploy new weapons systems before the Soviets could complete their production and deployment.

If, indeed, these were the circumstances in which the Soviets found themselves following their evaluation of their series of tests, what would be a more logical solution than to seek a treaty banning testing, and thereby freezing the level of knowledge in those critical areas where the Soviets judged themselves to have a distinct advantage, while leaving themselves free to test in that area of testing where they still felt they could make gains on the United States? Such circumstances are quite possible, and not in the least inconsistent with the knowledge which we now possess. Indeed, the facts to support such a theory of motivation are much more cogent and persuasive than is the basis for any of the possible motivations discussed by the Foreign Relations Committee in its report.

This theory of motivation may well not be accurate, but that only puts it at the top of the category of the possible motivations suggested by the Foreign Relations Committee.

There is one vital difference, however. If the motivation which I have suggested proves to be the correct one—and I am convinced that it is—ratification of this treaty will leave the United States with alternatives only of submitting to nuclear blackmail, nuclear war, or surrender; for, we will have no credible deterrent to nuclear war when the Soviets have managed to translate their nuclear knowledge into nuclear weapons, a period which could take from 3 to 5 years or possibly a little longer.

Thus, even in the absence of the consideration of the questions of the possibilities of clandestine testing by the Soviet Union or a second surprise abrogation of the treaty with a new series of tests by the Soviet Union, the military risks inherent in this treaty are formidable—even fearsome. The crux of the military disadvantages is the fact that, unlike the conditions that existed in early 1961, we no longer have a clear superiority in nuclear technology, and in many areas of weapons design and effect all the evidence supports a conclusion that the Soviets now enjoy a superiority in nuclear technology.

The test ban treaty tends strongly to freeze the Soviet advantages in nuclear technology. Such a freeze could be used to compensate for their relatively slow productive capacity, so that they could, in time, confront us with deployed weapons systems which could, at least in their own judgment, give the Soviets a clear superiority in strategic power, especially if this power is used to carry out a first strike against us.

At the very least, it gives the Soviets time to convert their knowledge into weaponry, so that they end up with a qualitative and quantitative parity of strategic weapons with the United States. Again, in view of the differing strategies, this would give them the advantage which might well be the basis for a de-

cision to carry out a first strike resulting in nuclear war.

Under existing circumstances, even if the treaty is observed by the Soviets according to the letter of the treaty, the military effect is to diminish, if not entirely negate, the possibility that the United States can continue to maintain the overwhelming strategic nuclear power which will deter and prevent a nuclear war as it has in the past.

As serious as these military aspects of the treaty are for the United States, there are other factors which add to the number and magnitude of the risks. These factors are the possibilities of undetected or unidentified clandestine tests by the Soviet Union, and of another surprise abrogation of the test ban by the Soviet Union.

Our existing capabilities to detect and identify nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, underwater and in space are the best now existing in the world. These capabilities are not the best the state of the art in this country will permit. However, if the treaty is ratified, substantial improvement would be very costly and unavoidable.

There are many uncertainties about our detection and identification capabilities. There are obviously thresholds below which the capabilities are degraded seriously, and in some cases, disappear. Future developments by the Soviet Union could quite conceivably degrade substantially our existing detection and identification capabilities. These uncertainties exist, in varying degrees and under differing circumstances, in all environments covered by the test ban treaty.

The potential dangers of clandestine testing by the Soviet Union in the three environments covered by the test ban treaty do not rank among the major military disadvantages to the United States resulting from the treaty, nor even as one of the major risks should the treaty be ratified. There are, however, certain elements of risk flowing from the possibility of clandestine testing which should be noted even though they pose minimum hazards and dangers to the United States in and of themselves, since these elements of risk are in some respects cumulative to the military disadvantages above noted.

First, there is little probability that relatively low-yield, low-altitude, or surface nuclear detonations in the Soviet Union would and could be both detected and identified under all circumstances by the United States. Although there are different opinions in scientific testimony as to the degree to which isolated tests of this type could influence the strategic balance of power, there is no question that such additions to Soviet technology derived from such tests would be cumulative in areas of technology where the Soviets now either have, or possibly have, a lead; thereby increasing the military disadvantages of this treaty.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator if he is familiar with the statement by Adm. Lewis Strauss? I believe Admiral Strauss served as Chairman of the

our missiles off, or whether our guidance systems and control systems would be destroyed, or whether the exotic effects of the nuclear explosion would play such a part that we could not direct our missiles to the target, or whether they could even take off from the ground. There was serious concern about these things, and it is necessary for us to obtain further information on whether our systems would be able to penetrate the enemy's antimissile defense; and whether our antimissile defense system, which we ought to be developing, and which I hope someday we will be deploying would be able to withstand the enormous missiles that would be fired at us as well as the effects of our own defensive missiles. The only way that can be determined is through actual tests in the environment in which these weapons are actually to operate, in order to determine the exact results.

Mr. TALMADGE. From what the Senator has said, the testimony of the scientists displayed a fear of the unknown—that we did not know what the reaction would be, while at the same time the Soviets probably know, through their tests, what the reaction would be.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator has expressed that point correctly, except that we do have some knowledge on the matter, which provides a very real basis for the concern, although that knowledge is limited. The evidence indicates the Soviets know more, though probably not everything.

Mr. TALMADGE. I thank the able Senator very much for permitting me to ask these questions of him. He is delivering a very able speech. I wish I could stay for the remainder of it, but I must keep an appointment. I assure the Senator that I will read it with great benefit in the RECORD tomorrow.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able Senator for his kind remarks.

Since the United States does not know the results of the Soviet experience in testing multimegaton weapons, we are not capable of evaluating the military effectiveness of such multimegaton weapons.

We are further handicapped by the fact that we have not subjected most of our major missile weapons systems to operational proof tests. Only the Polaris system has been subjected to a full-scale systems test. Atlas, Minuteman, and Titan have had no such tests. At this point, we must estimate, without full knowledge, the reliability of these weapons systems, even in the absence of enemy attack. This makes it even more difficult, if not wholly speculative, to estimate the reliability of such weapons systems in the nuclear environment of attack.

Even more important, in assessing our deterrent capability, we cannot with any degree of confidence know what the Soviets believe the reliability of our weapons systems to be, since we do not have their weapons effects knowledge upon which they base their judgment.

A particularly vital area of technology is the antiballistic missile field. Despite the generalized statements of conclusions by some witnesses, which have had the tendency to confuse the

relative levels of technology in this field, a specific analysis of the tests themselves is the best indicator of the facts. The Preparedness Subcommittee thoroughly examined the details of all the tests relating to this subject. While the specifics of information on both our tests and those of the Soviets are classified, the subcommittee summarized the situation as follows:

In the field of weapons effects experiments related to the design and development of an effective antiballistic missile (ABM) system the evidence, although less conclusive, indicates that the Soviet Union in 1961 and 1962 conducted a series of complex high-altitude operations which, if properly instrumented, could have provided substantial and important data on various types of radar blackout and nuclear effects. These Soviet experiments were clearly dictated by an ABM development program.

The United States has conducted no experiments comparable in complexity to those Soviet operations and a disturbing number of the U.S. high-altitude-effects experiments which were conducted were compromised either by considerations unrelated to the technical objectives of the test program, by inadequate or faulty instrumentation, or by operational inadequacies.

Only the limitations of security classification prevent the presentation of more specific proof of the obvious Soviet lead in technology in the ABM field.

As is shown by the chart of U.S. test requirements on page 6 of the Preparedness Subcommittee's report, those areas in which we have the most vital deficiencies of knowledge are the precise areas where we cannot acquire significant advances with underground tests.

There is an additional disturbing feature which must be taken into consideration in any comparison of United States and Soviet nuclear testing experience. A large number of the U.S. tests have been devoted to the purpose of developing capabilities for detecting, identifying and analyzing nuclear tests and other nuclear detonations carried out by other nations. This was a very essential program, and has given us a more realistic estimate of our own detection capabilities, although here, as in other areas, large uncertainties still exist. Apparently the Soviets have devoted few of their tests to such purposes. Any comparison of numbers of tests designed to evaluate the relative levels of technology for weapons design and weapons effects in the United States and the Soviet Union must be qualified by the disparity of numbers of tests for the purpose of developing and improving detection techniques.

Equally important to a realistic appraisal of comparative tests is the fact that the Soviets, who do not adhere to a second-strike policy, can concentrate their tests on a more narrow spectrum of interests than can the United States. Because of our second-strike policy, a substantial number of our tests must be devoted to ascertaining the capability of our own weapons systems to survive a nuclear attack. The Soviets, who do not plan to await an attack before launching their nuclear forces, do not need to test so extensively on the ability of their own systems to withstand nuclear at-

tacks. Their technology can concentrate on the vulnerabilities of U.S. systems and the means to exploit those vulnerabilities.

On the basis of comprehensive study and comparisons of Soviet and United States nuclear technology, the Preparedness Subcommittee found the military disadvantages to the United States to be as follows:

1. The United States probably will be unable to duplicate Soviet achievements in very high yield weapon technology.
2. The United States will be unable to acquire necessary data on the effects of very high yield atmospheric explosions.
3. The United States will be unable to acquire data on high altitude nuclear weapons effects.
4. The United States will be unable to determine with confidence the performance and reliability of any ABM system developed without benefit of atmospheric operational system tests.
5. The United States will be unable to verify the ability of its hardened underground second-strike missile systems to survive close-in, high-yield nuclear explosions.
6. The United States will be unable to verify the ability of its missile reentry bodies under defensive nuclear attack to survive and penetrate to the target without the opportunity to test nose cone and warhead designs in a nuclear environment under dynamic reentry conditions.
7. The treaty will provide the Soviet Union an opportunity to equal U.S. accomplishments in submegaton weapon technology.

As is obvious, most of these disadvantages result from the absence of a capability by the United States under the treaty to acquire knowledge of weapons design and weapons effects in areas in which there is at least a probability that the Soviets have more knowledge than do we.

In addition—and this is the eighth disadvantage in the report—the treaty would diminish our capability to learn of Soviet advancements in technology. With testing limited to underground, we would be denied the knowledge we can gain from analysis of radioactive debris from Soviet tests. With the passage of time, our knowledge, or basis for estimates of the state of the art of nuclear weaponry in the Soviet Union, will be materially degraded.

The military aspects of the treaty can be placed in perspective only if translated into the effects on our capability to maintain the overwhelming superiority of strategic power essential to an effective deterrent of nuclear war in the years to come.

We know that the Soviets now have a clear superiority in the technology of multimegaton weapons design, and under this treaty the United States could not surpass or even duplicate that knowledge. In the absence of such knowledge, we cannot realistically evaluate the military value of such multimegaton weapons.

We know that the Soviets have performed tests, which, if properly instrumented, have given them a lead in high-yield weapons effects technology. This knowledge, if now possessed by the Soviets, cannot be acquired by the United States under the terms of the test ban treaty. We cannot, therefore, realistically assess the vulnerabilities of our



own weapons systems to the high-yield blast, shock, communications blackout, and exotic radiation and electromagnetic phenomena. The Soviets, from the tests they have already conducted, could know both the vulnerabilities of our weapons systems and their own capabilities with multimegaton weapons to exploit those vulnerabilities. Since it is the potential enemy's estimate of the survivability of our second-strike force after their attack which determines the effectiveness of our deterrent force, the importance of our lack of knowledge of what the Soviets know assumes critical proportions.

The importance of the relative levels of technology in the ABM field derives from the fact that deployment of an effective ABM system could seriously degrade, if not nullify, the deterrent capability of a nuclear force composed of ballistic missiles. An ABM system which falls short of perfection can nevertheless seriously degrade the credibility of a missile force deterrent, especially when combined with an offensive force designed to exploit vulnerabilities of a second-strike force with a first attack.

In summary, the facts developed by the Preparedness Subcommittee over a period of 5 months of investigations and hearings, which included a detailed study of tests by both sides, show a bleak, dismal and doubt-pervaded prospect, if this treaty is ratified, for the U.S. capability to maintain the overwhelming strategic power essential to deter nuclear war.

Intimations have been heard, and some of them not very subtly put, that the conclusions of the Preparedness Subcommittee are overly pessimistic. Surely no one can charge, however, that the report of the Preparedness Subcommittee is more pessimistic than the report of the Foreign Relations Committee is optimistic. Indeed, the Foreign Relations Committee report has one characteristic in common with U.S. intelligence estimates of the situation in Cuba prior to October, 1962. They both adopted the most optimistic conclusion from the standpoint of the United States that the facts, or any presentation of the facts, would possibly support.

However, even accepting the conclusions of the report of the Foreign Relations Committee as correct, for the sake of argument, the prospects for maintaining an effective deterrent if this treaty is ratified are most discouraging.

The report of the Foreign Relations Committee, in discussing the probable motivations of the Soviets, states:

Soviet scientists presumably are confident that in many critical areas of nuclear weaponry they have achieved a rough technical parity with the United States.

If Soviet scientists are confident that the Soviets have achieved a rough technical parity with the United States in many critical areas of nuclear weaponry, as the Foreign Relations Committee says, the days of continued credibility of the U.S. deterrent force are numbered, and the one thing that has prevented nuclear war for so many years is doomed. Regardless of how wrong the Soviet sci-

entists may be in their judgment—and we do not know the technological information on which they base their judgment—our nuclear force will no longer constitute a deterrent, if they do not believe in its superiority. Their plans are based on a first-strike strategy, and under conditions of parity from other standpoints, this gives them a very distinct edge. There is small consolation that the Soviet scientists may be overconfident, and that the optimistic conclusions of the Foreign Relations Committee as to the relative levels of technology may be correct, thus making it possible for us to retaliate effectively after a Soviet nuclear attack. We might even bring more destruction on the enemy than was visited upon us, but we would have failed in our primary purpose in creating and maintaining our strategic forces—to prevent a nuclear war through deterrence.

Quite obviously, the Foreign Relations Committee report refers to the judgment of Soviet scientists that a parity exists in nuclear weapons technology, rather than a nuclear weapons parity, although the report does not specifically so state. There is little doubt that the United States today has a clear superiority in strategic nuclear forces—that is, in quality and quantity of weapons in place. There is small comfort in this distinction, however, for, as Dr. Edward Teller so accurately and succinctly stated:

A disparity of knowledge today is a disparity of power tomorrow.

When the serious military disadvantages to the United States as a result of this treaty are pointed out, there is often a response made that only one side of the picture is being considered. This argument maintains that if both sides continue testing, nuclear parity will surely result. Another version of the same rationale is that further testing by the United States may stimulate testing by others who will thereby overtake U.S. technology. This argument is based on the false premise that there has been an all-out arms race in nuclear testing by the United States and the Soviets.

Unquestionably, in the 1961 and 1962 series of tests, the Soviets tested at a rate which was probably near the maximum of their capability. It takes two to make a race, however. The United States, unfortunately, was not even running. In the period since the test moratorium was overtly broken by the Soviets in September 1961, the Soviets have conducted approximately three times the number of tests that the United States has conducted, and this includes, of course, only the Soviet tests of which we have knowledge. Again, even this disparity must be expanded in view of the fact that some of the U.S. tests were for the purpose of improving detection techniques, that others were related to the peaceful uses of nuclear detonations, and the fact that the first-strike strategy of the U.S.S.R. permits the Soviets to concentrate more on weapons design and effects—the most pertinent technology to strategic power. In terms of average yield, the Soviet tests of 1961 and 1962 were a high multiple of the average yield of U.S. tests.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am glad to yield. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the able Senator from South Carolina agree that we shall never be able to develop a dependable atomic missile defense without testing in the atmosphere?

Mr. THURMOND. That is my opinion. During their recent tests, the Russians made tests in the atmosphere that showed that they were testing for the development of an antimissile system; and it is clear that they have gained knowledge which they can use now in manufacturing weapons to perfect a more advanced ABM system. Unless we test in the atmosphere, we shall not be able to determine what will actually occur when such a weapon is used in the environment in which it is designed to be used.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Has the Senator from South Carolina heard the arguments to the effect that we can develop a practical, workable missile defense without ever testing it under actual trial conditions?

Mr. THURMOND. Yes. Today, we have an antimissile program. We have not produced or deployed it, but we have an antimissile designed that has in tests knocked down 8 out of 12 shots, as I have already stated. However, it would be impossible to perfect this system and develop it to a point where we would feel we could rely upon it, because testing underground will not be the same as testing in the environment in which it will actually have to operate. No one can tell what results will be forthcoming when tests are actually made in the atmosphere.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator from South Carolina knows, of course, that at present we have no dependable answer to the problem of destroying a missile which is accompanied by a number of decoys. In other words, the Russians may have, or get, large missiles with multiple warheads and multiple decoys. If one is fired at us, it can be expected to explode, while on its way, and to separate into 25 or 30 components—perhaps 25 dummies and 5 actual bombs.

Mr. THURMOND. That is correct.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. We have no present answer to that problem. We also know that if we try to shoot them down with an atomic missile, there will be a communications blackout—for which we have no answer at present. The blackout caused by the first explosion would make it impossible to see the following missile.

Some contend that perhaps we can "design around" this problem. As I understand, the idea is to have at other places a number of radar systems which perhaps could spot the missiles. But in that event, if war broke out between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, we would be confronted with probably hundreds of missiles fired simultaneously; and therefore it might not be possible to "design around" that problem.

In addition, is the Senator from South Carolina familiar with the fact that



Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The witnesses testified before us about the respects in which they believe we are ahead of the Soviets. I ask the Senator, how could they know such things? Has the Senator any reason to believe that our people know what the Russians know about atomic weapons? Would it seem more likely that the Russians have a way of keeping those things secret?

Mr. THURMOND. The testimony given before the Preparedness Subcommittee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are on the other side of this question, with respect to various points is very clear that in certain fields the Communists are ahead. When one looks at those points, relating to where they are ahead, it is frightening. Our information of Soviet technology is limited, but through analysis of radioactive debris from Soviet tests, we have some information.

I suggest, if the Senator has time, that he read the testimony given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on that point. The staff has it available. It has been summarized. I believe that seven or eight different points are covered. It is well worthwhile reading.

Today in my speech I shall bring out as well as I can, without violating the rule against divulging classified material, what is involved. A little later I shall come to the disadvantages of the treaty.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Has the Senator explored in his mind the possibility that if the Soviets wished to do more testing it could be done on Chinese territory? So long as we were not able to prove that the Russians were doing it, so long as we merely suspected and were unable to prove it, we would be bound by the treaty to continue to refrain from testing.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator has brought out a key point. That is a question which I propounded to some of the military and scientific witnesses who testified before the Preparedness Subcommittee. I asked, "What would keep the Russians from shifting their equipment and scientists just over the Chinese line, thousands of miles away from where we can reach, so that we would never know whether the testing was done in China or in Russia?"

That is exactly what they could do. The evidence which was brought out in the investigation showed that it could be the case.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Would it not be easier to arrange to do the testing on Chinese territory than to go to the expense, small though it might be, of providing an adequate underground tunnel to conduct explosions?

Mr. THURMOND. That could be done by the Russians. With the instruments which we have today we might be able to pick up those tests, but we would not be able to tell whether they were conducted in Chinese or Russian territory if they were conducted near the line. It would be impossible to tell that. The Russians could go near to the line and carry out a series of tests, and then the Russians could deny that they had anything to do with them, and it would be difficult to tell on which side of the line the tests were being conducted. If the

Chinese were conducting the tests, that still would not be a violation of the treaty, technically speaking, yet it would be an effort inspired by, prescribed by, supervised by, and under the leadership of the Russians.

We could not even be sure who was testing if we determined the detonation was of an advanced device.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. From the Communist point of view, would that not be a fine, patriotic thing for them to do, for the benefit of their nation?

Mr. THURMOND. There is no doubt about it. They would not hesitate to do that, if they thought it to their advantage.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does not the Communist doctrine teach that it is the duty of Communists to do that sort of thing?

Mr. THURMOND. Absolutely. That brings up the next question, about the rift. It has been claimed that there is a rift between Russia and Red China. I asked the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "If there were a showdown today with Russia, on whose side would China be?" They answered, "On the side of Russia," in their opinion.

I asked, "If there were a showdown today with China, on whose side would Russia be?" and they answered, in their opinion, "On the side of China."

If the showdown is coming between our Nation and Russia or between our Nation and China, and if those nations will be, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff think they will be, standing together, what difference does it make if there is any rift?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not also correct that all those people really argue about is, "Which is the better way to destroy the United States?"

Mr. THURMOND. That is the whole question. The Senator has put his finger on the point. They ask only, "Which is the best way to destroy the United States?"

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. From the Russian point of view, it is by entering into this treaty. They think this is the best way to conquer the world.

Mr. THURMOND. Russia appears to feel that is the best way to proceed. Russia feels that it should proceed gradually to take over the world by subversion, deceit, and deception; by getting us into traps and placing us in such a position that we will either be destroyed or have to surrender.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Meanwhile, they obtain every military advantage they can. If the result of this treaty should be to retard us from developing modern weapons of the future, while the Communists rushed pell-mell ahead, using the information that they may now have, would that not be advancing the doctrine for which Russia is contending, namely, that this is the better way to subjugate the Western nations?

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am grateful to the Senator for permitting me to trespass upon his time. I have been very much troubled about this treaty, and I believe the majority of the members of

the Preparedness Subcommittee, of which the Senator is one, have rendered a great service to this country in pointing out in the report how the treaty would prejudice our defense. I congratulate the Senator for the speech he is making.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the distinguished and able Senator for the questions propounded. They have been information-seeking questions. They have brought out information that I hope will be of value to the American people.

On the Preparedness Subcommittee, headed by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, all members but one agreed to the report. The ranking Republican member, the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], did not agree. One member, the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] had additional views, however. The others were all in accord on the report, and even the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] went along with the report with the addition of individual views.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If a Senator concludes, as I do, that this treaty would prejudice the defense of the United States, and that it would result in this Nation being second best as compared with the Soviet Union in weapons of the future, would it not be his duty, as well as the duty of the rest of us, no matter how much the political repercussions might affect this Nation, to vote to continue to develop the most modern weapons, and to reject the treaty, if we concluded that the treaty would adversely affect our defenses?

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is correct. Furthermore, in my judgment, the only thing that has prevented the Russians from using nuclear weapons in their aggressions and their efforts to take over this country is our tremendously superior nuclear striking power. It has been the deterrent that has hindered and kept the Russians from starting a nuclear war. Now, since the Russians have gained this vast knowledge from recent tests, and their advantages will be frozen if the treaty is ratified, we are going to be greatly handicapped, because the Russians have scientific knowledge about high-yield weapons, weapon effects, and antiballistic missiles, which are vital to us and our future, that we do not have; and the only way we can obtain it is to test in the atmosphere.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I thank the Senator very much. I shall listen with interest to the remainder of his speech. I regret to say that few Senators are present to hear the speech this afternoon. What the Senator from South Carolina is presenting should be heard and studied by every Member of the Senate before he votes on the treaty.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senator for his kind remarks.

Obviously, therefore, we cannot credit ourselves with strategic superiority sufficient for a credible deterrent force if we merely possess a numerical advantage in weapons of roughly equivalent quality to those of a potential aggressor. Our announced second strike strategy—or our public renunciation of a first strike—places a burden upon us to maintain an

overwhelming superiority in quality and quantity of strategic weapons. It is a heavy burden from many standpoints, and puts us at a distinct disadvantage. In the past, and even now, we have managed to carry that burden, and since it has effectively prevented a nuclear war, it has been worth the extra effort required.

In assessing our ability to deter a would-be aggressor in the future, we must, therefore, examine the relative levels of technology today, and the prospect for relative technological progress in the near future, always keeping in mind that our self-imposed second strike strategy requires far more than a numerical and qualitative parity to maintain a credible and effective deterrent.

With these two factors in mind, it should be clear that our current superiority in nuclear weaponry, standing alone, or even combined with our capability to produce greater quantities of today's weapons in the future, offers little comfort that we can maintain an effective deterrent force in the future. As impressive as is our weapons array at the moment, it is sobering to recall that we have not begun production of a strategic weapons system of later vintage than 1957. To be sure, existing weapons systems are constantly being improved, but the absence of any new strategic weapons system for more than 6 years is an invitation to obsolescence.

The most pertinent issue on the question of our capability to maintain a sufficient strategic nuclear force to insure that we can deter a nuclear war in future years is the relative levels of nuclear technology in the United States and in the Soviet Union at present. Since the three environmental test ban will inhibit the development of technology in certain areas, if observed, the existing level of technology when this treaty would go into effect is particularly pertinent in those areas.

The Preparedness Subcommittee has studied for months the relative balance of nuclear technology between the United States and the Soviet Union. The investigation included the compilation and comparison in detail of each and every nuclear test conducted by the United States and the knowledge gained therefrom, together with the best information available in this country on each of the Soviet tests on which we have information.

The conclusions drawn from this comparison, to the extent permitted by security considerations, are presented in the report of the Preparedness Subcommittee. Admittedly, estimates of the Soviet achievements are conservative, and are by no means based on the sound rule of military intelligence that the most pessimistic judgment as to a potential enemy's capabilities should be drawn.

In general, the comparative rates of testing by the United States and by the Soviet Union in the past 2 years is significant. In 1958, when the test moratorium began, the United States held a clear superiority over the Soviet Union in the yield-to-weight ratio over the entire range of deliverable weights for weapons. One-fifth of the U.S. tests had

been in yield ranges above 10 megatons, and the Soviets had conducted no tests above 10 megatons.

During 1961 and 1962, the Soviet Union conducted more than twice the number of tests of yields above 10 megatons that the United States has ever conducted, and more than four times the number of tests the United States conducted in the same yield range in the same period. The Soviet Union has demonstrated in these tests capabilities for a clearly superior performance to the United States above about 15-megaton yield. The last U.S. experience in this yield range was in 1954, almost a decade ago. Our uncertainty about the design of such Soviet weapons is most disturbing.

In the multimegaton yield ranges, it is quite obvious that the Soviets now hold a clear superiority in technology.

In the yield ranges below a few megatons, available evidence indicates that the United States continues to hold a lead in weapons design and performance. This is the precise area in which the United States has concentrated. Even this lead is not positive enough to be too reassuring, however. Prior to the moratorium, the United States had conducted more than twice as many tests in this yield range as had been detected in the Soviet Union. The number of tests in this yield range that we know the Soviets conducted in 1962 and 1963 indicates clearly that the Soviets are intent on challenging the U.S. position in this range, and this is an area in which continued testing underground, permitted by the treaty, can contribute to further advancements of technology.

In the lower yield ranges, we know far less of the Soviets' testing experience, for our detection, identification, and analytical capabilities are degraded at the lower end of the yield range spectrum. The Atomic Energy Commission indicated that available evidence would not permit a comprehensive comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. capabilities in this yield range, and recommended that a development capability for the U.S.S.R. comparable to that of the United States be assumed.

Under present circumstances, the acquisition of knowledge concerning weapons effects is as crucial, if not more so, than knowledge of weapons design. In answer to questions, General LeMay stated that knowledge of weapons effects was clearly more crucial at this juncture. Unfortunately, this is one area in which the Soviets almost assuredly hold a lead. Judging from the knowledge which we have of Soviet multimegaton weapons tests, we must assume that the Soviet Union amassed a significant and valuable body of data on high yield blast, shock, communications blackout, and the exotic effects of radiation and electromagnetic phenomena which are not now available to the United States, and which we cannot acquire with underground testing.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from Georgia.

Mr. TALMADGE. In 1962, the Soviet Union made tests of an extremely large type of weapon, as I recall, of perhaps 50 or 60 megatons. Is that correct?

Mr. THURMOND. Yes.

Mr. TALMADGE. Have we any information as to what effect such tests would have on systems that might be used for our own missiles fired from submarines or land bases?

Mr. THURMOND. The evidence before the Preparedness Subcommittee indicated that it could be very serious. In other words, the blast, shock, communications blackout, and the exotic effects of radiation and electromagnetic phenomena must all be taken into consideration. It is felt that the high-yield tests have been very beneficial to the Communists, in that they now know how to go about constructing the weapons they need, which could turn the tide in the cold war.

Mr. TALMADGE. I take it that we have made tests with some of our own weapons in the 10- and 15-megaton range.

Mr. THURMOND. That is correct. They are much smaller than those of the Communists. We have not tested above 15 megatons since 1954, and the state of the art has advanced significantly since then.

Mr. TALMADGE. When those weapons are fired, are our firing systems still operating accurately?

Mr. THURMOND. We still have far less weapons effects knowledge than we need. I do not wish to go into classified information, but we are very much concerned about the high-yield weapons, which the Communists are now able to produce with the knowledge they have gained. In my judgment this is one of the reasons for their wanting the test treaty, to get a breathing spell so that they can manufacture these weapons based on the knowledge which they have gained from their tests. Their production capabilities are poor. They will then be able to say to us, "Either surrender, or be destroyed."

Mr. TALMADGE. Is it the able Senator's view, then, that if they were to hurl bombs of great magnitude at us, say, in the 50-, 60-, and even 100-megaton range, the effects of the explosion might be felt by our firing mechanisms and therefore we would be unable to retaliate? Is that the thrust of the Senator's argument?

Mr. THURMOND. That is a distinct possibility, but our knowledge is limited. That is the opinion of some of the scientists and military experts. Furthermore, the Senator has put his finger on a key point, because we would not be able to hold tests to determine what the exact results would be.

Mr. TALMADGE. Was that fear supported by the majority of the scientists and the military, or by a minority of the scientists and the military?

Mr. THURMOND. I do not recall exactly about the number who testified, but they were all concerned about the effects of the firing of the high-yield missiles which could be dropped on us, and the effect it could have on the question of whether we would be able to get

us—without war, if they can; but with war, if they must.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from Louisiana is absolutely correct. When Lenin took over Russia in 1917, he said the aim of the Soviets was to dig the graves of all other governments, and to be the heirs and successors to all the other governments in the world. The present Communist leaders have not departed from that philosophy. That was Stalin's goal; and that is Khrushchev's goal. That is the goal of all Communists. They have not abandoned that goal. Even since this treaty has been signed, the Communists have said this treaty is in their interest. They have tried to assure the people of Yugoslavia that this treaty is in the interests of the Communist world. They have tried to assure the Red Chinese that this treaty is in the interests of communism and for the benefit of the Communist world, and that it will hasten what the Communists call the final stage of the revolution.

Anyone who studies and reads enough to understand communism knows that the only time when the Communists will enter into an agreement with another country is when they feel it will be to their advantage to do so. They will not hesitate to enter into a treaty, because, as Stalin said, they believe treaties are like pie crusts, and are made to be broken. They will not hesitate to break them when it is in their interest. They will observe them only when it is to their benefit to do so.

In 1958, they observed the moratorium only until they had made the necessary preparations for resumption of testing. So, after extensive preparations, in September 1961, they avowedly broke the moratorium and resumed testing. As a result, they have gained great knowledge which we do not have. But we must have it if we are to be able to manufacture the weapons necessary to deter war.

Because they have gained significant knowledge, they are willing to sign this treaty, so as to give them a breathing spell in which they can now manufacture their weapons in accordance with that knowledge. We should have that knowledge, too; but we can gain it only by testing in the atmosphere and in space.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I do not wish to point the finger of scorn at any of the fine men who serve in our Military Establishment. But is it not true that the military men who have testified in favor of this treaty serve under the President, are part of the executive branch, and are expected to support the major policy decisions of the administration?

Is it not also true that it is expected when the President appoints the Joint Chiefs or others who hold high, policy-making positions, he is entitled to insist that when final decisions on important policy matters are made, they support the President's position?

Mr. THURMOND. Of course. An able former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told me that those in that position feel they should support the Presi-

dent's decisions if they possibly can, because he is their Commander in Chief and is the President. So they believe that they should either support his decisions or should state outright to the President that they cannot do so—so that if he then wishes to relieve them from their duties, he can then proceed to do so.

But, as military men, they have been trained to take orders; and in this case they were told to consider the political implications, as well as the military implications. I understand they were further told that in considering the political implications, they should consider the information furnished them by the State Department, and should also consider that that information was correct.

If that is true—and that information came to me—then they had to weigh the political considerations along with the military considerations. But, of course, they are military men, not political men. General LeMay gave us a clue when he said that if this treaty were today in its proposal stage, he would not recommend that it be signed.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. As a practical matter, is it not more or less traditional that if one who holds the position of Chief of Staff of one of the armed services feels that he must oppose the President, the Commander in Chief, and if he believes he should advise Members of Congress to vote against the recommendations of the Commander in Chief, he should then tender his resignation?

Mr. THURMOND. I believe the Senator is probably correct. It is quite interesting to note that when General Twining—a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but not now directly "under the gun"—after recently studying this question for the Air Force, testified before us in secret session, the effect of his testimony was that this treaty is not in the best interests of our national security.

Adm. Arleigh Burke, who is a former Chief of Naval Operations and a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made a similar statement to the effect that it would be a great mistake to ratify the treaty.

Admiral Radford filed a statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations. He is a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is not now under the gun directly. He made a strong statement against the treaty which every Senator should read.

In addition, other generals who are still in service, but who are not members of the Joint Chiefs and not in top positions, came in and testified. I admire them greatly for their courage in doing so. I wonder if their testimony will affect them in the positions to which they have been assigned. I hope it will not. It is also worthy of note that the Air Force Association today issued a statement against the treaty.

I do not believe any objective person who heard the statement of General Power would be inclined to favor ratification of the treaty. General Power has

charge of our delivery systems to send the missiles or the bombers to drop the bombs in case we get into a war. He is the man who, if he received orders from the President to drop nuclear weapons, would press the button which would command the planes or missiles to go.

General Power must know every detail and implication relating to the military and pertaining to nuclear warfare and nuclear development. He is an expert on the subject. He is also chairman of the group that targets all of our strategic weapons.

General Schriever, who has charge of our testing, development, and missile program, is also an expert.

Both those men feel that the treaty would not be in the best interest of our national security. They do not take into consideration any of the so-called political factors. They look at the question from the standpoint of the security of the United States.

I should like to hear those who maintain that we must consider the problem primarily from a political angle say to what political angle they refer. What is the politics involved which is worrying them? What is the political angle? I should like to hear any Senator who thinks there is an overriding political consideration tell the Senate and the people of our country what political aspect overrides the military disadvantages and risks. I ask that question in the face of testimony of military men who are not now under the gun, and who are free and able to say that to ratify the treaty would not be in the best interest of our national security, and who point out that we are risking the only deterrent that has to date prevented a nuclear war—our strategic nuclear force.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I was not in a position to hear all of the witnesses who testified before the Foreign Relations Committee. However, I did have the opportunity to read most of the statements and also to hear the testimony of Dr. Teller, who in my opinion gave us some very enlightening information in this field.

It seemed to the Senator from Louisiana that we should keep two things in mind: First, what effect will the treaty have upon the defense of the United States? Will it affect us adversely or will it affect us favorably?

Second, what effect will it have upon our international relations? In my mind, there is no doubt that, all things being equal, it would be desirable to have some sort of test ban treaty with all the nations of the world. But, on the other hand, if by doing so we would greatly imperil the future defenses of the United States, we should ratify no such treaty as the one before the Senate.

Dr. Teller pointed out various ways in which the treaty could prejudice the development of the new weapons needed to defend our country. So far as the Senator from Louisiana is concerned, that testimony was not successfully refuted. Dr. Teller further said that there is additional information that he could give us to show why the treaty would prejudice the United States, and why it



would prejudice us even worse than was indicated in his public statement. The Senator might be interested to know that our committee thought so little of the man who was correct about the hydrogen bomb, and without whom we probably would not have been preeminent in that field, that we did not even call him back to tell us in full session the classified and secret information which he communicated to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, of which the Senator from South Carolina is a member.

Some Senators wished to wait at least until the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee had made its report. Those are men who should be experts in that field. Senators have been talking about the foreign aid bill, and how much money we might give to some backward countries. The Senator is a member of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, which is discussing the development of new weapons, how much they will cost, how long it will take to acquire them, and so forth. So some members of the committee thought we should wait until the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, which had heard a considerable amount of expert testimony from the defense point of view which we had not heard in the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported.

As the Senator knows, we did not have the benefit of that information. On the morning we voted, the junior Senator from Louisiana placed a telephone call to the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] is a man whom I greatly admire and one whom I once supported for the nomination of President of the United States. I voted for the Senator from South Carolina for President.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Both Senators serve on the Committee on Armed Services. The junior Senator from Louisiana placed a call to a man who perhaps for 20 years has been a member of the Committee on Armed Services. He has been chairman for a long period of time. He is a man whom President Truman once said was probably the best qualified Democrat to be President, and a man who probably would have been President except for the fact that he was a Southerner. The Senator from Louisiana desired to know what the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] thought about the question after that able statesman had had an opportunity to receive information that the Senator from Louisiana did not possess.

I regret to say that the Committee on Foreign Relations did not see fit to wait until those who are experts in the field of atomic power and who would be our best experts in the field of preparedness, could give their advice.

It seems to me that we are rushing things very gravely and dangerously, when we proceed to rush ahead and try to ratify a treaty of the sort proposed without having carefully considered the best advice that we can get, which would

indicate that the treaty would prejudice the defense of the United States.

I say to the Senator that I shall vote against the treaty. Perhaps I shall have more to say on the question later in the debate. I shall vote against the treaty because, as a former member of the Committee on Armed Services and as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am fully convinced that the treaty would be a very good deal for the Soviet Union and would very seriously prejudice the future defense of our country.

I know that some people are concerned about the fallout problem. The best experts on that subject have told me that we should not let that question control our thinking in this field, and that it is a minor problem compared to the other major, weighty problems, such as the ability of our Nation to defend itself from destruction by enemy nations.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator has spoken of the problem of radiation fallout. Dr. Foster, who has charge of one of our nuclear laboratories, testified that a man living in the mountains of Colorado would get more additional radiation from living in that area due to the height than he would get from fallout resulting from nuclear testing.

Also the Senator might be interested in knowing that a recent book has been written by Earl Voss, entitled "Nuclear Ambush: Test Ban Trap," which is concurred in by scientists and experts. This book brought out the fact that a man wearing a wrist watch with a luminous dial will receive 10 times more radiation than he would receive from fallout from testing. A man living in a brick home would get 20 times more radiation than he would get from the fallout testing.

Much of what we hear about fallout is bugaboo. It simply does not exist. Dr. Seaborg, upon being questioned by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], brought out very clearly the fact that the amount of radiation now is not dangerous. There is no danger.

Of course, if there should be a nuclear exchange, and if fallout should result from it, the radiation which would occur would be dangerous, and lethal.

Certain people would like to stop testing to reduce the dangers of radioactive fallout. The point is that it is not necessary to stop testing, because we can now test with clean weapons and devices. The manner in which we test is such that we can test without the dangers of fallout. We have been doing it. The scientists say we can continue to do it.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. As I understand the situation, all of the testing which has been done by all the powers on earth which have atomic weapons is estimated to have increased radioactivity in the atmosphere by about 10 percent. That increase in radioactivity will gradually dissipate itself. It will gradually decay, in some 70 years from now or perhaps a longer period of time. Eventually it will decay and dissipate itself from the atmosphere, and will make

no difference. But the radioactivity in total has been increased by about 10 percent.

The sister of the junior Senator from Louisiana moved from Baton Rouge, La., to Boulder, Colo. When she did so, though she did not know it—she liked the atmosphere there and the family thought it would be good for their health—she subjected herself to 70 percent more radioactivity, because the atmosphere in Boulder is less dense than that in Baton Rouge.

The family thought it would improve health. Probably it did. The more arid atmosphere probably improved her health to a greater extent than the detriment caused by an increase in radioactivity.

If a person were born and reared in the state of Kerala in India, because of various mineral deposits, that person would be subjected to an increase of radioactivity of 1,000 percent, compared to the radioactivity in Washington, D.C. Nobody in Kerala ever knew there was a problem. Nobody there knows it now. How could those people have survived, if they were subjected to an increase of a thousandfold above what we are now talking about; that is, the amount of radioactivity which would result from the explosion of these bombs in tests?

The practical approach is that such a contention should not control our thinking. I regret to say that most people who believe we ought to ratify the treaty are inclined to so believe for that reason. Sometimes I have a feeling that that might have been the reason why the Russians exploded a 57-megaton bomb, to try to terrify the world into agreeing to a treaty like this.

Mr. THURMOND. That could have been the reason, or at least, one of the reasons. I agree with the Senator that radiation from fallout is a big "bugaboo" which is being played up today, with some people saying that is one of the reasons why we should ratify the treaty. In my judgment that contention has no merit; just as other reasons given for wanting to ratify the treaty are without merit.

I think this country will take a dangerous step if the treaty is ratified.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, when one reads the testimony by the Secretary of Defense—upon which the administration relies for its case—one finds that his argument breaks down to this: That the United States is extremely strong, that we presently are ahead of the Soviet Union in a number of respects, and that this treaty would tend to maintain the advantage we possess.

I should like to ask the Senator if we are ahead of the Soviets with regard to the big bombs.

Mr. THURMOND. We are not ahead of the Soviets with regard to the high-yield weapons. The Soviets have a lead. It is assumed that we are ahead of the Soviets with respect to the low-yield weapons. At a later point in my speech today I shall cover that point in greater detail.



ballistic missile system, the only way definitely to determine if such a system would be successful and would really produce results and operate, is to test it in the environment in which it would have to operate. That would be the atmosphere.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. One simple problem that is easy enough for a person to appreciate is this: If we are to develop a reliable defense against enemy missiles, not merely a defense that could shoot down the first missile, I would presume that we already have the capability to develop such a defense—but the ability to continue shooting down the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, or even the 100th missile fired at us, aimed at the same point, we must develop an ability to locate and track such enemy missiles headed for our country, even though the atmosphere would be disturbed by the exploding missiles we are sending out, and recognize the possibility that even enemy missiles may be exploding out in the atmosphere and creating what is known as a radar blackout.

At present, we do not know how to solve that problem. It has been suggested that we "design around it." I assume that means we would hope, if the radar were blacked out at New York, that we might be able to pick up enemy missiles by radar at Philadelphia, for example. But if one is trying to defend against a barrage of 300 or 400 enemy missiles fired against us simultaneously—perhaps a thousand fired simultaneously—with more coming, we must be able to continue to track with all the radar equipment and continue to shoot missiles down, even though some of our defenses will be destroyed simultaneously with the defending of them. There is no way in which that kind of defense can be developed without atmospheric testing.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is eminently correct. It would be impossible to develop a type of antiballistic missile system upon which this country could place complete reliance until such a system had been tested in the atmosphere, which is the environment in which the system would have to operate if an exchange should take place.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Senator aware of the fact that some of those who advocate the treaty undertake to say that it cannot be done; that no one will ever be able to develop a successful missile defense? Where would this country be now if we had taken the attitude 30 years ago, or even 20 years ago, that it could not be done? Where would we be if we had taken the attitude that the atom could not be cracked; that the atom was something that could not be harnessed? Where would we be if we had taken the attitude that a proximity fuse could not be developed? Where would we be if we had taken the attitude that the airplane could not be developed, and that men would never be able to fly? Where would we be if we had taken the attitude that space could not be conquered? We would be far behind our potential adversaries. They would be in a position to hand us an ultimatum to

which we would either have to surrender, or else be destroyed.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from Louisiana is correct.

I recall that one of the scientists—I believe it was Dr. Teller—testified that several years ago he was doubtful about this system; but he is now convinced that it can be successful.

Consider what the Russians have done. This information is now public. When I spoke on this subject before, much of the information was disclosed in secret session. But it has now been made public and has appeared in the newspapers. I do not think there is any question now that the Russians have developed a system which our intelligence says will knock down medium-range missiles, those calculated to go to 1,200 miles, and intermediate-range missiles, those calculated to go to 2,500 miles, and, under certain favorable conditions, intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Immeasurable progress has been made. I was talking with one of our military men a few days ago about the Nike-Zeus, which is our best antiballistic missile development to date. He says that 8 shots out of 12 have been successfully made. This shows that the system can be and is being developed. We know the Russians have made great progress in that field. Not only have they developed a system, but they have deployed a system function around a certain city in Russia.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Let us assume for a moment that the Russians already have the information they need in order to develop a successful missile defense. Is it not correct to assume that they have been ahead of us in missile development all the time; and if they have succeeded in developing what they need for a successful missile defense, and we by this treaty make it impossible for our Nation to develop a successful missile defense, will we not, by ratifying and confirming the treaty, have placed our Nation in a position in which it could be destroyed?

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from Louisiana is a man of vision on that point. He certainly sees the facts as they exist. The Communists have made great advances in this field. Some of their tests were obviously dictated by antiballistic missile requirements, as the Preparedness Subcommittee points out in its report.

From September 1961, in 1962, and this year, they have been conducting extensive high-yield-weapons tests. They have obtained vast amounts of knowledge and information which we do not possess. In order to gain such knowledge, we would have to make tests in the atmosphere; but this treaty would not permit us to make tests in the atmosphere. Therefore, if this treaty is ratified, the gains the Communists have made in recent years in connection with the development of an antiballistic missile system and the development of high-yield weapons will be beyond our reach. The gains they have made in the recent tests will thus be frozen, and we shall never be able to obtain the knowledge that we need.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McIntyre in the chair). Does the Senator from South Carolina yield to the Senator from Louisiana?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Senator from South Carolina also aware of the fact that no one has ever been able to rely on the Soviets to keep their word? I know he realizes that the only time when the Soviets have kept a treaty or an agreement was when it served their immediate interest to do so.

Mr. THURMOND. Yes. The able Senator from Louisiana is certainly familiar with the record of the Communists in connection with keeping treaties and keeping their word. I believe the Defense Department issued a pamphlet last November on broken treaties; it can be obtained from the Department. In one column, the treaties are listed; in the next, is a statement of how each treaty was broken and when it was broken.

The Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security has compiled a report on Communist treaties; and I understand that the subcommittee has recently released a supplement to that report. It shows clearly that the Communists cannot be relied upon to keep their word. They will not keep their word. Their goal is world enslavement and domination. They are driving toward it every day. To them, truth is anything that promotes communism; and they feel they are warranted in saying anything and doing anything to accomplish that goal.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Senator from South Carolina familiar with the fact that the Communists teach that anything that will promote the spread of communism is justified?

Mr. THURMOND. Yes.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. From the point of view of a Communist, if he tells the truth of if he fails to cheat or fails to victimize us, to his own advantage, then he has committed an unpardonable and treasonable act. Does not the Senator know that if a Communist is asked how far a certain paved road continues, we can be sure that whatever he tells us will be wrong. If the road happens to be 50 miles in length, he will say it is 5 miles in length or 1 mile in length. One can be sure that whatever a Communist tells us will be wrong. The reason for that is that he is unwilling to tell us the truth, and he realizes that if he does reply at all, we may find the truth. From the Communist point of view, it is much better that we be misinformed, rather than that we be ignorant.

When we are dealing with the Communists, we must realize that they are seeking to subjugate our country. They want to take charge; they want to make us bend to their will; and they want to find a way to victimize us. That is their entire purpose. That is why they are willing to sign an agreement of this sort.

I should like to ask the Senator from South Carolina whether he agrees that their dedicated purpose is to destroy

may be, in no way detracts from the fact that the treaty which the Senate is now considering is, in and of itself, important—even vital; for this treaty bears significantly on the fundamental issues of liberty or subjugation, peace or war.

The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which recommends that the Senate ratify this treaty, while recognizing that the treaty does have military implications, minimizes the military aspects and states that the main thrust of the treaty is political. In view of the report's warning to the Senate that excessive reliance on military considerations could undermine national security, it is particularly interesting to note that the majority of the space in the report is devoted to explaining away the military implications of the treaty.

In its discussion of the military aspects of the treaty, the Foreign Relations Committee report quite accurately points out in some detail that the United States now has a clear and overwhelming superiority in strategic nuclear power. Drawing from the specifics of our arsenal which Secretary McNamara made public for the first time during his testimony, the report cites the strength of the Strategic Air Command at more than 500 SAC bombers on quick alert, and more than 500 missiles—Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Polaris—new in the U.S. force. Even without accepting these rather loosely rounded off numbers as precisely accurate, no one can seriously doubt the present clear superiority of the U.S. strategic nuclear power. As has been the case since World War II, the United States still has strategic power that can and does, as it has in the past, effectively deter any would-be aggressor.

It is precisely this significant imbalance of strategic power that has prevented the occurrence of a nuclear war for almost two decades. Our policy of deterrence, based on an overwhelming superiority of nuclear power, has proved to be an effective preventative of nuclear war. Gen. Thomas Power, commander of the Strategic Air Command, put the matter most succinctly in his testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee. He stated:

I am seriously concerned about losing our military superiority, because I think that this superiority has resulted in a peaceful world as far as nuclear war is concerned, and I can't think of anything more important than to keep the world safe from a nuclear war.

I think if we get into one, there will be no winners, only losers, and I think mankind will have reached its highest plateau of stupidity if it tries to reach its aims and goals or settle its differences with nuclear weapons.

However, I think that our formula to prevent this has been a successful one to date, and it is a real simple formula. We have had overwhelming military superiority to the point where it is ridiculous for Mr. Khrushchev to even seriously contemplate attacking this country. Now I maintain that it is possible to hold this type of lead, and that is what I recommend.

As stated by General Power, that great SAC commander, we have found by experience that a policy of deterrence can and does prevent nuclear war. There are two essential ingredients of a successful policy of deterrence. The first

is the actual strategic superiority, which in this day and age, means nuclear superiority. Second, a potential aggressor must be convinced that we have such overwhelming superiority that it would be utterly foolish to seriously contemplate an attack and that such power would be unleashed if attacked.

The very fact that there has been no nuclear war is convincing evidence that we have had, and still have, overwhelming nuclear superiority, and that the Soviets are convinced that we have that superiority. No further back than last fall, when Khrushchev made his bold gamble in Cuba, it was our overwhelming strategic nuclear power, and Khrushchev's knowledge of that superiority, that prevented a nuclear war.

It is not enough to say that we now have a clear nuclear superiority in weaponry, however. If our policy of deterrence of nuclear war is to continue, and we intend to prevent a nuclear war in the future as we have in the past, we must either continue to maintain an overwhelming superiority, or turn to some untried and untested formula for preventing nuclear war. This requires a closer look at our strategic force structure.

In assessing either the present or the future balance of strategic military power, a most distorted picture will result from any oversimplified comparison of weapon for weapon, or weapon for target, on a simple numerical basis. A realistic view will result only if the comparison includes a qualitative analysis of the weapons, together with an analysis of the strategies which control the use and employment of such weapons.

Today, for the first time in many years, the United States does not have a manned bomber aircraft in production. Our weapons production is concentrated on ballistic missiles. Whatever the merits of the differing opinions as to the advisability of putting almost sole reliance on missiles, the dramatic shift in emphasis from manned aircraft to missiles demonstrates the fact that military superiority depends on the quality of weapons more than it depends on numbers. It is the qualitative factor of weaponry that accounts for obsolescence. For example, right now we are in the process of dismantling the Texas towers, which comprised a part of the obsolete-before-deployed SAGE system, the aborted brainchild of Dr. Jerome Wiesner. No matter how much of the Sage system we still have deployed, it is immaterial; for its existence makes no difference to the balance of strategic military power. No numerical increase can substitute for qualitative improvement. There is nothing you need so much of as something which is not very good.

It is the qualitative factor that makes it impossible to judge tomorrow's or next year's balance of power by the number of weapons we have deployed today, or by the number of today's weapons we will be able to produce tomorrow. Today's weapons will be obsolete tomorrow, and the number we have or can produce will be increasingly irrelevant with the passage of time. If, therefore, we want

a realistic idea of the probable balance of strategic power in the future, we must consider primarily the question, What are the relative levels of weapons technology today? More than any other factor, it is the level of technology today that will determine the balance of strategic power in the future.

The second fallacy of numerical comparisons of weapons, and weapons against potential targets, is most apparent in the arguments of those who dwell on what they mistakenly call the overkill capability of the United States. Those who expound the theory of overkill seem to believe that only one weapon per target is needed, and that the number of weapons which exceeds the numbers of potential targets is surplus to needs, or overkill.

The fallacy of such reasoning is the omission from consideration of the realities of the strategy which determines the use or possible use of the weapons.

By this time, it surely should be clear that the United States is committed to a second strike nuclear force. Our strategic weapons are to be used only after we are attacked. This means that we must rely for deterrence, not on the total number of weapons in our arsenal, but only on those weapons which would remain operative after an all-out nuclear attack against the United States. Since we do adhere strictly to a second strike strategy, we must rely, in fact on the number of our weapons which a potential aggressor believes would survive the most destructive nuclear barrage he could launch. In making an assessment of this deterrent force, a potential aggressor will, of course, take into account the quality and reliability of our weapons system.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Senator a member of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee?

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from South Carolina is a member of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Then the Senator is familiar with the report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, which states that in eight major ways the treaty would prejudice the defense of the United States.

Mr. THURMOND. That is correct. I discuss those ways later in my speech.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Those eight ways are set forth on pages 7 and 8 of the interim report of that subcommittee.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the Senator agree that in some ways the treaty could adversely affect the United States to the extent that we would probably never be able to develop a reliable defense against enemy missiles so long as we abided by the provisions of the treaty?

Mr. THURMOND. I certainly do, and this feeling is shared by the military men and the scientists, who, I feel, are best equipped to make an appraisal of that subject. In developing an anti-

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I became very curious about that word when I saw it. I have read General Eisenhower's letter several times. So I took it on myself to make indirect inquiries and get the story in such fashion that I could disclose it. He was not interested in reservations to the treaty; he was interested in an assurance that our nuclear arsenal would be available for our security and the security of our allies; and that is made abundantly clear in one paragraph of the President's letter. In addition, there is an addendum note in the committee report that has a bearing on that point. It is generally recognized that such weapons would be so used.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is it the Senator's view that that entirely satisfies the view of General Eisenhower as to what should be the reservation?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Exactly.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that has been made clear.

General Power was mentioned. General Power is one of nine who have what are called field commands in various parts of the world. He felt he could not approve the treaty. General Gerhart refused to give an opinion because, he said, he was not sufficiently informed, and it was beyond his competence. General Power is the only one who actually took a position in opposition to the treaty.

I was present when that matter was discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That information came through the Joint Chiefs, not by direct communication with me. General Gerhart did not wish to take a position. General Power was the only one who took a position against the treaty.

Counting General Eisenhower with the other active members of the military forces, including the Secretary of Defense, there are 14 prominent, leading men in this field in favor of the treaty, against 2 who have taken the other position. That is a pretty good average in connection with any controversial subject of this kind.

One other question which the Senator mentioned related to the possibility of change in Russia. The Senator alluded to a so-called alert No. 5, issued some time ago by the military. I do not question the fact. However, in the violations cited—and this information begins at page 132 of the record of the hearings—it will be noted that there has been some change in the tempo of repudiation of agreements since the decease of Mr. Stalin in 1953. The record of hearing shows that since 1953 there were four instances of violations of agreements, two of them being with Yugoslavia concerning loans, not unlike what I notice we are contemplating doing, in view of certain difficulties, in the case of Pakistan. It has been noted in the press that we are contemplating a change in our decision with regard to an airport.

In the case of two of these violations, one in January 1956 and one in August 1956, they related to matters in which we have no great interest. The only one really seriously affecting us is that relating to the Berlin wall, in which we

have a great interest. We have no interest in the other two, and I do not know that they were quite in the spirit of violation of treaties as we think of this treaty. They related to two loan agreements with Yugoslavia.

I do not say that this treaty is based on trust; I think it is more applicable to individual action and interest of the nations involved.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I mentioned that to establish the thesis that we are not unmindful of what has happened.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am bringing this point up only to show that nations do change. Merely because there have been violations does not mean that the Soviets will violate this treaty. As the Senator properly stated, I think they will avoid doing it, because it is in their interest to abide by the treaty, or it is not in their interest at all.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am very proud that we have in this country a fully operative two-party system. I again congratulate the distinguished minority leader, the leader of the Republicans in this body, for the position he has taken, not in behalf of party, but in behalf of the Nation, which includes both parties. He has done so without imputing to any Senator any base or ulterior motive if he happens to want to vote against the treaty, or wants to offer understandings or reservations, because he realizes, first of all, that, so far as each individual Member of this body is concerned, the time is fast approaching when we, as elected officials, in line with our constitutional obligations, must decide, each in his own mind, what he thinks is best for his country.

I am glad the distinguished minority leader brought out the plank in the Republican platform of 1960, on the particular subject of atomic testing, which was a stronger plank than the one contained in the Democratic platform of that year.

Like the distinguished minority leader, I question the motives of no Member of this body. I only hope that, in our collective wisdom, in the long run, we will be enabled to show that what we have done will be in the best interests of our country and the course which another elected official, the President of the United States, sought to follow in carrying out his duty.

Of course, there are diverse views in this body. I am glad there are. If every Senator were in favor of a treaty of this magnitude, I would then be truly worried.

There are doubts on the part of Senators who are in favor of the treaty, as well as those who are opposed to it. I am not surprised that there are fears and anxieties, because these are good in the consideration of a treaty of this kind.

I would hope also, as the distinguished minority leader has brought out, that we would not brush off what happened at Nagasaki and Hiroshima. I hope the figures will be repeated time and time again—66,000 killed, 69,000 injured, 62,000 buildings destroyed, in Hiroshima. And what caused that destruction? One bomb, allegedly equivalent to 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT. Now we are talking

about bombs of the equivalent of 100 million tons of TNT in one 100-megaton bomb.

I hope we will consider all the factors inherent in a study of this treaty, not only genetic and physical, not only military, not only political, but the combination of all these and any others which may be worth consideration.

I point out once more, because there seems to be a question in the minds of some people in this country that some sort of pressure was used to get the Joint Chiefs of Staff to come along, that the record will show that the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], chairman of the Armed Services Committee, asked each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if any pressure was exerted, and the answer was, unequivocally, "No."

Of course, they said that, in their opinion, a combination of factors determined their judgment. But when they were asked the direct question if they favored the ratification of the treaty—and it is in the record of the hearings, a copy of which is on every Senator's desk—the answer was yes, provided the safeguards which they advocated were contained herein and which, to the best of my knowledge, no Senator disagrees with.

We have been given assurance by the President of the United States, and that assurance has once again been brought to the attention of the Senate because of the initiative of the distinguished minority leader, who, in my opinion, has once again performed a real public service, for which I hope he gets the credit he deserves and not the condemnation which sometimes comes his way. I salute a great American.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, this has been one of the finest hours in the history of the Senate. We listened to a great American today. We listened to a leader of one of the great political parties, who discharged his responsibility of leadership. He brought to the Senate a message from the President of the United States, which answered some of the questions lurking in the minds of certain Members of the Senate.

Beyond all that, based upon a unique lifetime of experience and devotion to his country, in uniform and in Congress, EVERETT DIRKSEN made all of us proud of the lucidity of his assertion, and an eloquence that is unmatched in the Senate. With it all he added overwhelmingly to the reasons why this country needs to be united and why, as I see the light, his advice and recommendation should be followed.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the President of the United States has characterized the three environmental test ban treaty as a first step, and if he says it is a first step, I, for one, am quite willing to take his word for it; for the President is the one who controls the negotiation of agreements with foreign nations, and he is in a position to know, from discussions which have taken place, what are the terms to which other powers will agree, or are likely to agree.

The fact that this treaty is a first step, and the contemplation—fond or foreboding—of what the succeeding steps



Mr. DIRKSEN. Anywhere that tensions exist. May it never be said of us that we are the ones to excite and peddle tensions all over the world.

Mr. CURTIS. That is correct. Tensions are a weapon of the Soviet Union. The tensions will go on in this country and in that country, with one act of subversion after another. Whether or not we should end testing in the atmosphere should be decided on the merits of the question, rather than a possibility that it will end the tensions of the cold war.

Mr. DIRKSEN. After 400 abortive sessions at Geneva, at long last when there is an opportunity for an expression and a demonstration of a little faith, I do not wish to be found wanting in that faith, in the hope that good fruit may come of it.

Mr. CURTIS. I am aware of the difference between the position of the Senator from Illinois, who has faith in this regard, and the position of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], who said that the treaty was not based on trust.

I shall hurry on. The Senator has been most generous in yielding time.

The Senator from Illinois mentioned that we would have a posture of readiness to test. May I ask the distinguished Senator whether that was President Eisenhower's position during the moratorium?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes; I rather think so.

Mr. CURTIS. Very well. Was it possible to carry it out?

Mr. DIRKSEN. It is possible to carry it out.

Mr. CURTIS. Was it? Not, "is it?"

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes; it is.

Mr. CURTIS. My question relates to what happened in the past. Was it possible, and did the United States carry out successfully a readiness to test?

Mr. DIRKSEN. The Senator from Nebraska is a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Senator has the seat I formerly held. I would rather ask some Senator who serves on that committee, who is familiar with what the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was doing at that time, because that would be a source of information.

Mr. CURTIS. I believe it is true that Johnston Island was permitted to go down. I believe it is true that tests were hurried. I do not care to go into any classified information as to how effective the tests were, but they were hurried, and, in a measure, very disappointing.

Mr. DIRKSEN. That is no reason why they had to be hurried. If the Congress and the President cooperate, if the request comes from the Atomic Energy Commission for equipment, for laboratory requirements, for personnel and for funds, and there is evidenced not only a desire but also a determination to move ahead and to maintain an immediate readiness posture, there is not the slightest reason why it cannot be done.

Mr. CURTIS. Other than that it was tried once and did not work.

Mr. DIRKSEN. That does not prove it cannot be done.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a comment?

Mr. CURTIS. I have almost concluded.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish to comment on that point. We did test underground 2 weeks after the time the Russians broke the moratorium, and for about 6 months in the atmosphere.

Mr. CURTIS. Those are the tests to which I referred, which were not very effective.

The Senator from Illinois spoke at length about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Such occurrences tear the hearts of everyone; but does it follow that someone whose position with respect to the treaty might differ from that of the Senator from Illinois would wish for a recurrence of those things?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Let me ask the Senator from Nebraska a question. Under the circumstances, with bigger and more destructive weapons being built all the time, with armament burdens upon every country in the world, unless we take a step in the whole domain of faith, what will be left except gloom and defeatism against the day when some careless person will pull the trigger?

Mr. CURTIS. I would rather have gloom than to slumber.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not hear the Senator's word. The Senator would rather have gloom than what?

Mr. CURTIS. Slumber, as a national posture.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The Senator says "slumber"?

Mr. CURTIS. Yes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Is there any reason why we should be complacent or incautious?

Mr. CURTIS. I do not know.

Mr. DIRKSEN. There is nothing in the treaty to that effect.

Mr. CURTIS. I know; but the Joint Chiefs of Staff have warned against it. Certainly there was a sound reason for their warning.

Mr. DIRKSEN. When I heard them at the committee meetings, they supported the treaty. They gave some attention to various things which I have recited, which were summarized in the record, but they supported the treaty.

Mr. CURTIS. General Power did not.

Mr. DIRKSEN. But he is not a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. CURTIS. No; but I read his testimony before the deletions were made. It is rather revealing.

Is there anything in the treaty which would outlaw—or give any assurance against—an atomic attack on any city in the world?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No. And no one said there was. The President made that as clear as crystal.

Mr. CURTIS. I could not understand the reason for the description of the attack on those two Japanese cities unless the Senator was offering something which would stop similar occurrences.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It is necessary to advance to that kind of goal a little at a time. There was no misrepresentation when it was said that this treaty is a first step.

Mr. CURTIS. No one has said what step it is. The Chinese proverb, "The journey of a thousand miles begins with one step," is true, but I am concerned about the direction in which the journey will proceed.

Mr. DIRKSEN. When we stop testing underwater, in the atmosphere, and in all the environments except underground, it seems to me that is a long step. The Republicans appreciated that fact in 1960, because that is precisely the way we set it out in our own party platform when we went to the voters for their suffrage.

Mr. CURTIS. I remind the Senator that since then the Soviets have tested. Many well-qualified people believe that they have acquired information which is very valuable, which we do not have; and that although they refused to agree at one time there is a likelihood that they will wish to agree now because there is some advantage in it, secret or otherwise.

We do not have the same set of facts before us. It is not a question of keeping faith with the treaty since there was a certain ratio of power and knowledge which existed then which does not exist now.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The best comment I could make is that a very distinguished former President of the United States and General of the Armies, Dwight D. Eisenhower, keeps abreast of developments and has not fractured his relationships with his former military associates. He has a very active mind. He expressed some concern on one point, which I think the President's letter cures, but he does support the treaty. One would believe that he is conversant with the advances made in that field by the Soviet Union, and the question of whether we are maintaining a superior strength.

Mr. CURTIS. The Senator has been more than generous. I did not intend to consume this much time. I merely wished to inquire into certain of the Senator's intentions in reference to the position he intended to portray to the country through the speech.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It has a large admixture of faith, and I hope it will always be there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I would rather yield the floor. I promised my distinguished friend from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] that I would not occupy the floor for more than 45 minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This will take only a few minutes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I congratulate the Senator. He has made a magnificent speech. I do not think he talked at length on any aspect of his speech. It was all very concise.

There was one aspect that the minority leader mentioned that I thought he had not developed fully. He said he would come back to it. It was General Eisenhower's letter, in which he used the word "reservation." I wonder if the minority leader will go further into that point. I thought he said he intended to refer to it later.



45 minutes with the President and expressed our concern. We made certain suggestions to him. In response, on September 10, he sent this letter, which reached me by hand last night at half-past 6. Let me read it to the Senate:

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
Washington, D.C., September 10, 1963.  
Hon. MIKE MANSFIELD,  
Hon. EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD AND SENATOR DIRKSEN: I am deeply appreciative of the suggestion which you made to me on Monday morning that it would be helpful to have a further clarifying statement about the policy of this administration toward certain aspects of our nuclear weapons defenses, under the proposed test ban treaty now before the Senate. I share your view that it is desirable to dispel any fears or concerns in the minds of Senators or of the people of our country on these matters. And while I believe that fully adequate statements have been made on these matters before the various committees of the Senate by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless I am happy to accept your judgment that it would be helpful if I restated what has already been said so that there may be no misapprehension.

In confidence that the Congress will share and support the policies of the administration in this field, I am happy to give these unqualified and unequivocal assurances to the Members of the Senate, to the entire Congress, and to the country:

1. Underground nuclear testing, which is permitted under the treaty, will be vigorously and diligently carried forward, and the equipment, facilities, personnel, and funds necessary for that purpose will be provided. As the Senate knows, such testing is now going on. While we must all hope that at some future time a more comprehensive treaty may become possible by changes in the policies of other nations, until that time our underground testing program will continue.

2. The United States will maintain a posture of readiness to resume testing in the environments prohibited by the present treaty, and it will take all the necessary steps to safeguard our national security in the event that there should be an abrogation or violation of any treaty provision. In particular, the United States retains the right to resume atmospheric testing forthwith—

That was a point I made with the President, I said, "It has got to be made"; and he put it in his letter—if the Soviet Union should conduct tests in violation of the treaty.

3. Our facilities for the detection of possible violations of this treaty will be expanded and improved as required to increase our assurance against clandestine violation by others.

I hope particular attention will be given to this paragraph:

4. In response to the suggestion made by President Eisenhower to the Foreign Relations Committee on August 23, 1963, and in conformity with the opinion of the legal adviser of the Department of State, set forth in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am glad to emphasize again that the treaty in no way limits the authority of the Commander in Chief to use nuclear weapons for the defense of the United States and its allies, if a situation should develop requiring such a grave decision. Any decision to use such weapons would be made by the United States in accordance with its

constitutional processes and would in no way be affected by the terms of the nuclear test ban treaty.

5. While the abnormal and dangerous presence of Soviet military personnel in the neighboring island of Cuba is not a matter which can be dealt with through the instrumentality of this treaty, I am able to assure the Senate that if that unhappy island should be used either directly or indirectly to circumvent or nullify this treaty, the United States will take all necessary action in response.

6. The treaty in no way changes the status of the authorities in East Germany. As the Secretary of State has made clear, "We do not recognize, and we do not intend to recognize, the Soviet occupation zone of East Germany as a state or as an entity possessing national sovereignty, or to recognize the local authorities as a government. Those authorities cannot alter these facts by the act of subscribing to the test ban treaty."

7. This Government will maintain strong weapons laboratories in a vigorous program of weapons development, in order to ensure that the United States will continue to have in the future a strength fully adequate for an effective national defense. In particular, as the Secretary of Defense has made clear, we will maintain strategic forces fully ensuring that this Nation will continue to be in a position to destroy any aggressor, even after absorbing a first strike by a surprise attack.

8. The United States will diligently pursue its programs for the further development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes by underground tests within the terms of the treaty, and as and when such developments make possible constructive uses of atmospheric nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the United States will seek international agreement under the treaty to permit such explosions.

I trust that these assurances may be helpful in dispelling any concern or misgivings which any member of the Senate or any citizen may have as to our determination to maintain the interests and security of the United States. It is not only safe but necessary, in the interest of this country and the interest of mankind, that this treaty should now be approved, and the hope for peace which it offers firmly sustained, by the Senate of the United States.

Once more, let me express my appreciation to you both for your visit and for your suggestions.

Sincerely,

JOHN KENNEDY.

Mr. President, late the other night I went back to refresh myself on a little history. One of the classic reports made in our generation was the one made by John Hershey, to the New Yorker, on what happened at Hiroshima. It makes one think. It came as an account from a Japanese preacher who long ago was educated at Emory University, in Atlanta, Ga. He did his undergraduate work there and developed great fluency in English. He was one of the principal witnesses when John Hershey went to Hiroshima to write that almost deathless account.

The B-29's had bombed nearly every Japanese town except Kyoto and Hiroshima. The Japanese called the B-29 "Mr. B," out of respect for the might and the power of that great wartime bomber.

As he relates the story, it was 8:15 in the morning of a bright, sunny day. The weather was a little humid and warm. At 8:15, things happened. Out of the

20th Air Wing, Col. Paul W. Tibbets, Jr., flying that B-29, and with two escort observation planes, flew over the center of Hiroshima, a town of probably 375,000 persons. Then, for the first time, the whole bosom of God's earth was ruptured by a manmade contrivance that we call a nuclear weapon.

Oh, the tragedy. Oh, the dismay. Oh, the blood. Oh, the anguish. When the statisticians came to put the cold figures on paper, they were as follows: As a result of 1 bomb—66,000 killed; 69,000 injured; 62,000 structures destroyed. That was the result of that one bomb, made by man in the hope of stopping that war. Little did he realize what this thermonuclear weapon would do, and the anguish that would be brought into the hearts of men, women, and children. At Hiroshima it caused a mass incineration such as never before had been witnessed in the history of the whole wide world. The result was almost too catastrophic to contemplate.

In the accelerated march of history, how quickly we forget. But there is the account, for all to read; and it all happened at 8:15, on a bright and shining morning, when God's day began, and when, I suppose, hundreds of thousands of people were thinking that, despite the war, they had been privileged to live another day.

Mr. President, that happened 18 years ago last month. Since then, what have we done? What steps have we taken? How far have we moved?

The President calls this treaty a first step. What sort of steps have we taken, except steps to make the bombs that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki look like veritable toys when compared to the heavy-duty, heavy-yield weapons of today?

I want to take a first step, Mr. President. I am not a young man; I am almost as old as the oldest Member of the Senate, certainly am older than a great many Senators. One of my age thinks about his destiny a little. I should not like to have written on my tombstone, "He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he did not take a first step."

God willing, Mr. President, and in the frame of my own party's platform and with the knowledge that the Soviet Union has violated treaties, there must still be enough faith, and enough confidence to make us willing to take a first step in this field.

If it fails, we will still be here. We have not forfeited caution. We have forfeited nothing. The President has given us assurances in regard to what is proposed to be done in underground testing in these and other environments and in regard to developing all the equipment necessary in order to maintain our strength against any aggressor on the face of the earth.

Mr. President, I believe it is just as well to conclude this slightly rambling discourse by reverting to the Chinese proverb, "The longest journey begins with a single step."

This is a first, single step. It is for destiny to write the answer. It is for history to render judgment. But with

consummate faith and some determination, this may be the step that can spell a grander destiny for our country and for the world.

If there be risks, Mr. President, I am willing to assume them for my country.

So I support the treaty; and I will vote for approval of the treaty with no reservations whatsoever.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, let me congratulate the Senator from Illinois on his magnificent speech.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I am glad to yield.

Mr. CURTIS. I thank the distinguished Senator. I trust that he will be willing to answer a few questions.

Mr. President, I love and admire the distinguished Senator from Illinois. He is most persuasive. He is patriotic. He is fair in the conduct of his office as a Senator. I listened intently as the Senator from Illinois recited the testimony he had heard, the documents that he had read, and the interviews that he had had. Does the Senator intend to imply that it would not be possible for another Senator to attend the same meetings, hear the same testimony, read the same documents, possess an equal sincerity of purpose, and yet arrive at a different conclusion from that reached by the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Absolutely. That is what makes the world the great world that it is. We can listen to testimony, come to different conclusions about it, and do so honestly and sincerely. I would not for a moment reflect upon the integrity, the honor, the honesty, the sincerity, or the conviction of any other Member of this body.

Mr. CURTIS. The distinguished Senator is so charming and so persuasive—

Mr. DIRKSEN. Should I disclaim that?

Mr. CURTIS. The Senator is dangerous. He can lead us astray.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I would not do so wittingly or knowingly.

Mr. CURTIS. I know that. The Senator spoke at length about fears that have been expressed in various places. Then he told of this great effort—and it was a great effort—to allay those fears. Is it the opinion of the Senator from Illinois that those fears came from the unlearned people of the country or those who did not honestly desire the right answer in the cause of peace?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I can answer only with respect to my own misgivings. Those arose in such large measure from the fact that I was not fully informed as to what our readiness posture was, how diligently and vigorously we were going to pursue it, to make sure that at no time and under no eventuality would our country be other than strong and equal to any aggressive effort that could be made against us.

Mr. CURTIS. Perhaps I have not made my question clear. The Senator talked at length about the fears that exist. Then he spoke of his diligent efforts to allay those fears. My question is as follows: Do those fears exist only among people whose intentions toward our country and toward a peaceful world

are not good and people who do not know?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Certainly not. I recognize them as honest views springing from the consciences of people.

Mr. CURTIS. That leads me to my next question, which is this: I listened intently as the Senator told of his great efforts to allay those fears. It seems to me that we would have been helped greatly if, rather than allaying the fears, the possible justification for the fears might have been ascertained. Is that not the responsibility of the Senate?

Mr. DIRKSEN. That is a highly complicated field.

Mr. CURTIS. Is that not our responsibility?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I was thinking of those who testified. In all kindness, I refer to them as the second echelon in Government. But I like to hear from the President and the Commander in Chief who is at the top and who in that capacity can push the button, move forward, sideways, or pull back. That is the reason for the letter. The reason was to make sure that, as we move forward, we shall be ready at all times for any eventuality that might arise under the treaty.

Mr. CURTIS. I shall state the point a bit crudely. If someone should fear that his house was afire, would it be better to allay such fear, or to ascertain whether the house was afire?

Mr. DIRKSEN. One ascertains whether the house is afire. That is a physical thing that is easily ascertained.

Mr. CURTIS. I understand. The distinguished Senator spoke at length of the treaty violations of the Soviet Union, which seem to be nondebatable. Do I correctly understand the Senator to express an opinion that the Soviet Union has changed in that regard?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Perhaps so. There is a risk. We must take a chance.

Mr. CURTIS. Does the Senator believe that the Soviet has changed in regard to adherence to treaties?

Mr. DIRKSEN. When the Soviet Union became flexible enough to be willing to entertain the negotiation of a treaty, I would earnestly hope that there had been some change in its attitude. On that basis, I believe that while there is risk, it is a risk that we can accept with safety.

Mr. CURTIS. The Senator from Minnesota stated on television that the treaty was not based upon trust, but on hope. Do I correctly understand the Senator to say that he hopes the Soviet Union has changed, or that he believes that it has?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Who does not have hope? Does not the Senator from Nebraska?

Mr. CURTIS. I do not believe they have.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not say that. I asked if the Senator from Nebraska did not hope.

Mr. CURTIS. I hope the Soviet Union has changed. I do not believe it has.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Hope springs eternal. As the great salesman, Paul, said long ago, "Faith, hope, and charity"—those are the great virtues.

What would mankind be like without hope? What can we say to this generation that has been so steeped in cold war for more than 18 years if we say there is no hope, and no chance?

Mr. CURTIS. The distinguished Senator is generous and kind. He has led me to my next question.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Good.

Mr. CURTIS. The Senator spoke at length about the horrors of the cold war and how it has affected our people and the youth of our country. The effect is brought about by the actions of the Soviet Union moving forward in Cuba and many other places in the Western Hemisphere. It may be affected by our own defense program. The existence or nonexistence of nuclear testing will probably have no effect on the advances made by the Soviet Union in taking over territory and millions of people.

The Senator has read a letter from the President stating that our testing will continue, and that we shall be prepared. Now the Senator has aroused in our hearts a desire to end the cold war. Is it the intention of the Senator to present any evidence that the treaty would end the cold war?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I have no evidence that it would end any kind of war. Did not the President make manifest in the statement that accompanied the treaty that there is no assurance that even nuclear war, let alone cold war, will end? We hope for those desirable goals. That is the best we can do.

Mr. CURTIS. Why not hope that it will cure cancer or do some other very noble things? A message goes out to the Nation telling us of the horrors of the cold war. I want to know whether we are presented with a treaty that will end the cold war.

Mr. DIRKSEN. First, let us not let the analogy of cancer get too far away. Cancer is something over which human volition has no control. But where human decisions are involved, they concern operations of the mind. That is what we are dealing with when we talk about inhibitions on testing in the atmosphere and under the water. So there is not the slightest analogy between the two.

Mr. CURTIS. All right. We will erase that analogy. But is it the intention of the Senator from Illinois to suggest to the country that the treaty is a treaty to end the cold war?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not say that.

Mr. CURTIS. I did not say that the Senator made that statement. I asked if it was his intention to give that impression.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I only hope that, first, tensions will subside and, second, that perhaps we will say, as Solomon said to the Lord, "Give therefore Thy servant an understanding heart."

It may be that if we ease the tension little by little a better understanding will develop. If that understanding should come, we would have a good predicate on which to fashion the second, third, and fourth steps.

Mr. CURTIS. Where will we ease tension? In this country or in the Soviet Union?

"At long last I had two more discussions with the distinguished majority leader. I said, 'Mike, there is only one place where this question can be discussed at the top echelon, and that is with the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States.' I said, 'I have read the capitulation of Dr. Seaborg in the hearings. I thought it was excellent. But suppose the President had other ideas. I heard the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they expressed the hope that this would be done or that would be done or the other would be done.'"

I went to the upper office. It is rather difficult to get into that office. Sometimes I think it is easier to get a charge account at Tiffany's than to get into the upper office, where the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy meets. There I saw John McCone, who served as chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy under Eisenhower, and who now serves as Director of Intelligence.

I listened keenly. He had certain recommendations, as the distinguished chairman of the Joint Committee, the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PAS-TORE], so well knows.

I followed through on this matter because of the fear that continued to beset me.

Then I had another meeting with the distinguished majority leader. I said, "Mike, I think you ought to contact the President." The letter which I shall read a little later is not the result of the President calling me. It is the result of the work of the majority leader and the minority leader, who expressed a common fear, and who felt that they ought to talk with the Commander in Chief, because if there were to be assurances, they ought to come from the highest and most authoritative source, the President of the United States.

That was the foundation and background.

I should like to recite a few of the considerations which move me to support the treaty, not the least of which, of course, is the party position. I am a little old fashioned. I was here when Wendell Willkie appeared before a Senate committee, and when Tom Connally asked him a rather sharp question, Wendell Willkie said, "Oh, that is only campaign oratory." I was here as a public servant at that time. It is no campaign oratory in my book, when one's party goes to the country and asks the country to give to it the direction of the affairs of the country. That is either a covenant or it is not. If it is a covenant, it is made to be kept.

This was my party's platform in 1960:

We are similarly ready to negotiate and to institute realistic methods and safeguards for disarmament, and for the suspension of nuclear tests. We advocate an early agreement—

Listen to that—

We advocate an early agreement by all nations to forgo nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and the suspension of other tests as verification techniques permit. We support the President in any decision he may make to reevaluate the question of resumption of underground nuclear explosions testing, if the Geneva Conference fails to produce a satisfactory agreement.

That is what my party said to the country, as we rallied behind Richard Nixon. Out of 69 million votes we came within 113,000 of victory. Oh, yes, we have a party in this country. I do not subscribe lightly to party platforms. I have served on the platform committee of my party when such solemn words were indited. They become lures to get the people into one's corner. There is something grave and solemn about it. I accepted the platform plank in that spirit. We said:

We advocate an early agreement by all nations to forgo nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

That is what we seek in the treaty today.

Second, 89 nations are now signatories to the treaty. Think of the propaganda weapon that we would give Nikita Khrushchev if we failed to stand up and ratify the treaty. He could go into all the areas of the world and say to their leaders, "Did I not tell you for many years that they are imperialists, capitalists, and warmongers? Here is the proof. They refused to subscribe to a cessation of testing of the hideous weapons that can snuff out so much life."

That would be a consideration in itself for supporting the treaty. Our arsenal of weapons is available. I shall touch on that later. It will be remembered that on the 23d of August former President Eisenhower sent a letter to the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I have read it several times. He used the word "reservation." It bothered me. I decided to pursue it. I did so. Through one of his assistants I contacted him at Gettysburg. Was it an inadvertent use of the word, which is a word of art in this business, or did he really mean it? Did he know what a reservation really meant? It was not the significant thing in the mind of President Eisenhower. What he wanted to be sure of was that there would be an ironclad assurance that our nuclear arsenal would be available for ourselves and for our allies if the need ever arose. I will deal with that point at a little greater length in connection with the President's letter.

Suppose there is deviation. Suppose there is abrogation. Will we be ready, and would we move into it? That was another point on which I wanted some assurances.

The President in his message to the Senate said it was a first step. So it is. The Chinese—and perhaps it comes from Confucius himself—have a saying: "The longest journey begins with the first step." A step must be made somehow, because a whole generation of Americans has grown up in the atmosphere and intensity of the cold war.

The bombs fell in August 1945. Suppose a youngster was 12 years old. Add 18 to that. That is 30 years. Consider the generation that has not known anything except the cold war.

We are devoting hundreds of millions of dollars to studies of mental retardation and mental health. Does anyone mean to tell me that those pressures do not have an effect upon a nation? When I was in Britain, and the V-1's and V-2's

were falling during the late war, a prominent member of the House of Commons said, "If it keeps up, it will break the nervous system of our people."

Some think this is all remote. But it is not remote. There is an impingement of all these pressures, all these considerations, that are a part of the cold war. Yet a whole generation has grown up under them. How many more generations will grow up before we receive an answer to the question? That is a concern of mine; it must be a concern of every other Member of this body.

There has been some sentiment about the heavy-yield, high-megaton weapons as distinguished from those that we have; and one could detect a certain defeatism. I am not an expert in the field. I have never served on the Committee on Armed Services, which has the benefit of such information. I readily sit at the feet of those who are members of the committee; when I seek advice, information, and instruction. But I remember that in the war in which I was a soldier on the Western Front, our strength was on paper, but our cause was good, and we prevailed.

I remember when I helped to vote this country into World War II. Our air power was on paper. We made close distinctions between weapons that were in being and those that were being planned. So much was not in being. But our cause was good and we triumphed. Let it never be said that the Senator from Illinois has any spark of defeatism in his soul, no matter what the equation is as between weapon strengths, because I am pretty sure that our thermonuclear strength, coupled with our cause, will abide and prevail, as it has and as it must.

One other thing the President said: Do not expect too much of this treaty. I thought it sounded biased in the message, which contains 10 specifics. But the treaty will not necessarily stop war. We hope it will. We hope it is in the direction of peace. What else can we do except hope? But is there assurance? None. There are many things that the treaty will not do, and it is necessary to go back to what the President said in his message.

Abraham Lincoln had a rule, and I think it was a great rule. I jotted it down, so that I would have it correct. This is what he said:

The true rule in determining to embrace or reject anything is not whether it have any evil in it but whether it have more of evil than of good. There are few things wholly evil or wholly good. Almost everything especially of Government policy is an inseparable compound of the two so that our best judgment of the preponderance between them is continuously demanded.

That is the case in this instance. I have not heard anyone deny that there are risks in the treaty. But, as Lincoln said, every policy is a compound of risk and nonrisk, of good and evil. Which is the preponderant quality? That is why our judgment is demanded. So I must rationalize the problem in that fashion and on that basis predicate judgment.

With those concerns in my mind, and with those concerns in the mind of our distinguished majority leader, we spent



There was a nonaggression pact with Turkey in 1925, and ultimately a tremendous effort to secure rights from Turkey on the Black Sea Straits.

There was a treaty with Afghanistan in 1926. We have recently been host to the Afghan royal King. Yet the Soviets made Afghanistan cede a piece of territory.

I have a special interest in Lithuania, because there are literally thousands of Baltic people—Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians—in Chicago. A treaty with Lithuania not only was made but also was extended, yet it did not prevent the Soviet Union from annexing Lithuania.

So I have gone through the whole lesson book to get that side of the story. I went further than that. I referred to the records of 1933, when, during the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, the Soviet Union was recognized, on the 16th of November, 1933.

It intrigues me some to read Maxim Litvinov's letter. He was the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The letter was written in Washington. It was written to Franklin Roosevelt.

In the first paragraph he said:

It will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—

1. To respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way and to refrain from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States, its territories or possessions.

Paragraph 2 is worthy of recording, because at times we forget these things. In paragraph 2 Mr. Litvinov wrote:

To refrain, and to restrain all persons in Government service and all organizations of the Government or under its direct or indirect control, including the organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from it, from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquillity, prosperity, order, or security of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions, and in particular, from any act tending to incite or encourage armed intervention, or any agitation or propaganda having as an aim, the violation of the territorial integrity of the United States, its territories or possessions, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions.

These assurances go on and on. They were the foundation for the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States in the first administration of Franklin Roosevelt, in November 1933.

I want those people who send me all this documentation and literature to know that sources of information are available. I want them to know that I have been rather diligent in carrying out the pledge I made to them.

Second, I was curious about the sudden change on the part of the Soviet Union. When Mr. Dean was still our representative to Geneva—and then there had been 400 sessions—I was still a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The day Mr. Dean left for Geneva, I said, "Mr. Dean, come back with something worth while and I will support it. Come back with something else and I

will fight, and I will resist as best I can." So I served notice at that time.

Who would not be curious about the sudden change of heart? Is it China and the reported difficulties with the Soviet Union that have had some impact on Mr. Khrushchev? I do not know. But while I am about it, I want to give my own opinion of what I expect is a part of the Chinese situation. In 1953 China took a census. Probably a mistake was made. It took a little while to obtain corrected figures, and when that was done it announced to the world that the population of Red China was 583 million and that it was growing at a rate of 15 million or more each year. At that rate, China today has 730 million people. In 15 years she will have 1 billion people. Those 1 billion people will have to be fed.

A great many headaches, difficulties, and responsibilities have arisen, and will arise.

When I was in Burma, I visited about 10 miles down the Irrawaddy River and I was shown a great storage of rice. I was told that the rice was full of weevils. Then I was told that we sold 250,000 tons of Louisiana rice to Japan, and that it was their market. That is a surplus rice bowl. I flew over Thailand. I know the rice bowl in that area. I know the Laotian rice bowl. I remember being in that area when the French were fighting at Dien Bien Phu.

That is a large area; and the population of 1 billion must be fed. There is the pressure. Perhaps Mr. Khrushchev knows of that pressure. It may well be. Difficulties have been referred to with respect to these countries. There may be something real about it. It may be what was written on the parchments of history long ago when it was said, "It shall come to pass that when man is hungry he shall feed himself, and when he does he shall curse his king and his God."

There is nothing worse than a population pressure. What is to be done about it? Many countries have been through great hunger, and they have been impelled by a force that drove people not only to desperation, but to action.

That, of course, is a diversion; but I want people to know that I have tried to take a hard look. I have tried to fortify myself. I believe I have been diligent. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee can well say that I was present to listen to the testimony. The distinguished Senator from Mississippi can say that I was present to listen to Dr. Teller. In addition, Dr. Teller came to my office for a long visit. I sat with the Atomic Energy Commission under Director McCone. I have proceeded with diligence. I say that in modesty. I have tried to explore everything involved. I wanted to get the whole story.

I make that statement as I try to explain the question of treaty violations, evidences of lack of faith on the part of the Soviet Union, and the testimony of our leaders, like Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Dr. Teller, John McCone, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is no question about the anxiety and concern on one side, and the coun-

sel and advice stressed by those to whom we have committed the security and defense of our country.

Where do we turn in our difficulty if it is not to General Wheeler? Where do we turn to if it is not to Admiral McDonald? Where do we turn to if not to General Shoup, of the Marine Corps? Where do we turn to if not to the Chief of Staff of the Navy? They have been educated in our own schools, supported at public expense. We not only expect them to become competent in their field, but we also expect fidelity to duty, and we get it. They are ranged on one side, and history is ranged on the other. What choice does one take in the case of the treaty under those circumstances?

I detected one thing in every committee hearing I attended. I have detected it in much of the material that has come to my desk. I detected it in the letter that is attached to the 10,000 signatures that lie at the desk in my Capitol office. It was an overlay of concern, of anxiety, and of fear. It could be detected in the questions which arose, namely Where are we vis-a-vis the Soviet Union? Where are we in respect to heavy yield weapons? Where are we in respect to light yield weapons? What is the strategy? What is the pattern? What is the formula? Have we a readiness posture? Are we prepared to resume testing if necessary? What shall we do in the event of abrogation? What shall we do if there is evidence of deviation from the treaty?

All these questions arise in anxious minds and hearts. One cannot hear such questions without having some sense of apprehension and concern, himself. What do we do about it?

I began to toy with the idea of a concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Senate and the House. I conferred with the Parliamentarian. It had no place here, but it had only one purpose. It was to allay the sense of anxiety and fear I had detected on every ground.

I went to my friend the distinguished majority leader, and discussed the question with him. After thinking about it some more, I thought this was not the approach. Someone said, "Why did you include the House of Representatives?" After all, we must ascertain whether to implement the treaty or whether to implement a program. That was set out in the concurrent resolution. I drafted the resolution. I had it perfected. I thought. But I did not submit it. Then subsequently I went to the majority leader again. I said, "Mike, there is fear in the country. Why do people call at all hours of the night?"

One of the roughest scoldings I ever received was at 2 o'clock in the morning from a constituent of the distinguished Senator from Florida. I could not get him off the telephone. He said, "Don't you hang up on me. I am a taxpayer, and I am going to tell you off."

The number of telephone calls was legion. They came at the most awkward hours. I tried to accept all of them. Some of the callers would not wait, and it was a little difficult.

versity. These articles stated that about 3,000 children, mostly in the intermountain West, had received excessive doses of radiation from the tests conducted at the southern Nevada test site. The committee estimated that 10 to 12 cases of thyroid cancer would result as a consequent of this exposure. The article in the Washington Post stated that:

The committee said its analysis of the data shows that past tests exposed a number of local populations in Utah, Nevada, Idaho, and probably other communities as far away as Troy, N.Y., to fallout so intense as to represent a medically unacceptable hazard to children who may drink fresh locally produced milk.

Continued unrestricted testing by Russia and the United States, joined in time by other nations, will increasingly poison the air all of us must breathe. Even then, as the President has observed:

The number of children and grandchildren with cancer in their bones, with leukemia in their blood, or with poison in their lungs might seem statistically small to some, in comparison with natural health hazards. But this is not a natural health hazard, and it is not a statistical issue.

Nor does this affect the nuclear powers alone. These tests befoul the air of all men and all nations, the committed and the uncommitted alike, without their knowledge and without their consent. That is why the continuation of atmospheric testing causes so many countries to regard all nuclear powers as equally evil; and we can hope that its prevention will enable those countries to see the world more clearly, while enabling all the world to breathe more easily.

These are some of the reasons, then, that give us plausible grounds for hope that this treaty will be kept by the Soviet Union, as well as by the United States. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of past experience in dealing with the Kremlin, and we must remain prepared to resume our own testing, if ever the Russians default. In the meantime, the treaty itself will not change Communist ambitions, or eliminate the possibility of nuclear war; it will not, in itself, reduce our need for arms or allies, or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first step toward a more rational relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western World. Given the pressures of a deepening split between Moscow and Peking, this treaty could open the way to other settlements with Russia of far-reaching significance. To these possibilities we must remain alert and prudently responsive.

For nothing is more urgent than for the two nuclear giants to find a way out of their atomic dilemma. Today we confront one another like two oldtime Western gunmen standing face to face, pistols drawn, aimed and cocked, near the center of a log, lying across a yawning chasm. Neither can fire his pistol, because of the certainty that the other, even with a dying reflex, will also squeeze off a fatal shot. Neither can advance upon the other, because of the danger that a point will come when his adversary, from fear or uncertainty, may tighten his pressure upon the hair trigger of doom for both. Each is afraid to lower his weapon, or even to allow it to waver, because each expects that a momentary opportunity

for victory and escape will then be seized by the other.

Meanwhile, both protagonists grow tired. The hot sun beats down, and sweat forms around the tensely squinting eyes. Each wonders when—not if, but when—the other, fearing that he may be the first to weaken, will decide to take the deceptively smaller risk of getting off the first shot. Each feels that he must inch closer to his adversary, so it will be certain that the reflex shot, too, cannot miss.

Each knows in his heart that the situation cannot continue indefinitely, but must be resolved, in some way, before nightfall.

Is there not a likeness between this situation and our own dreadful dilemma with respect to the Russians? Now, with this test ban treaty, it is as if both parties had agreed that, on signal, each would take one step backward. Each can afford to do this. If he takes the step, and his opponent does likewise, there will be time to consider what the next step might be. Trust is not involved, only a true instinct for self-preservation.

Mr. President, it has been said that this treaty is a symptom of a "no win" policy. I say there can be no winners—not the Russians, not the Americans, not Western civilization itself—unless the atom is tamed. So let us begin here and now. We are a hundred men and women, clothed at this moment with a fateful responsibility. Let it not be said that it was the U.S. Senate, heir and custodian of the longest tradition of freedom in the history of man, which lacked the courage to take the first step back from the commitment to violence which offers only the specter of eventual extermination for our people, our country, and all we cherish.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Utah.

Mr. MOSS. Today Senators have heard one of the most persuasive and penetrating speeches on the proposed nuclear test ban treaty which will be heard in the Senate as this important subject is discussed. The senior Senator from Idaho, with his usual penetrating attention to detail, his broad background of knowledge of this subject, and his eloquence in expressing himself, has given the Senate an outline, a prospectus, or a viewpoint that I personally deeply appreciate. I call on Senators to read carefully in the printed Record what has been said today. I thank the Senator from Idaho for affording me the opportunity to hear a good part of what he said today.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator from Utah.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator from Idaho yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I, too, wish to say that the Senator from Idaho has made a valuable contribution to the discussion of the treaty. The Senator was most attentive in the hearings and followed them diligently. He is as well qualified to discuss the merits of the treaty as any other Member of this body.

As chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I appreciate his taking the pains to present his excellent speech, which was so well organized and presented to the Senate.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. I congratulate the distinguished senior Senator from Idaho upon an able address. It is a cogent analysis of the issue before the Senate.

But I wish also to recall, as the Record will disclose, that the senior Senator from Idaho, speaking in 1959 as the junior Senator from Idaho, made another eloquent speech on the floor of the Senate. Standing at his own desk in the rear of the Chamber, he urged just such a treaty as is now before the Senate. So I congratulate the Senator for his prescience and vision, as well as upon the delivery of an able speech.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator from Tennessee. At that time I drew much inspiration from the thinking of the Senator from Tennessee, who was one of the first to suggest that the United States might suspend further atmospheric testing unilaterally and challenge Russia to do likewise. This was most significant in contributing toward the position taken by the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom in the negotiations which led to the offering to the Russian Government of a treaty limited to the atmospheric areas.

Mr. GORE. I appreciate the generous references made by the Senator. If I recall correctly, I suggested that the United States take this step unilaterally, if necessary, but in the hope that it would be an invitation to the Soviet Union to join in the concert.

Mr. CHURCH. That is exactly so. I know the Senator from Tennessee shares with me the feeling of accomplishment that finally a treaty such as this has come before the Senate for ratification.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I join with other Senators in expressing thanks to the distinguished senior Senator from Idaho for the speech he has just delivered. For a long time the Senator from Idaho has been a student of the subjects he has discussed today. His contribution to the debate will be most enlightening, and will result in a better understanding of the difficult problems which confront all Senators in the consideration of a treaty of such importance as this.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. DIRKSEN obtained the floor.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield without losing the floor, so that I may suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield for that purpose.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. INOUYE in the chair). Objection is heard; and the clerk will continue the call of the roll.

The legislative clerk resumed and concluded the call of the roll; and the following Senators answered to their names:

[No. 156 Ex.]

Alken	Hartke	Mundt
Bartlett	Hayden	Muskie
Bayh	Hickenlooper	Nelson
Beall	Hill	Nuberger
Bennett	Holland	Pastore
Bible	Hruska	Pell
Boggs	Humphrey	Prouty
Burdick	Inouye	Proxmire
Byrd, Va.	Jackson	Randolph
Byrd, W. Va.	Johnston	Ruticoff
Cannon	Jordan, N.C.	Robertson
Carlson	Jordan, Idaho	Russell
Church	Keating	Simpson
Clark	Kennedy	Smathers
Cooper	Kuchel	Smith
Cotton	Lausche	Sparkman
Curtis	Long, Mo.	Stennis
Dirksen	Long, La.	Symington
Dodd	Magnuson	Talmadge
Dominick	Mansfield	Thurmond
Douglas	McClellan	Tower
Eastland	McGovern	Walters
Edmondson	McIntyre	Williams, N.J.
Ellender	McNamara	Williams, Del.
Ervin	Metcalf	Yarborough
Fong	Miller	Young, N. Dak.
Fulbright	Morse	Young, Ohio
Gore	Morton	
Hart	Moss	

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE], and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONROE] are absent on official business.

I further announce that the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] is necessarily absent.

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT] and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are absent on official business to attend a meeting of the Interparliamentary Union.

The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MECHEM], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] are necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present. The Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] has the floor.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I envy Senators who have time to commit words to paper and to present a formal speech to the Senate. I make that statement in all modesty. First, I wish I had the talent for it; second, I wish I had time for it, because it makes an infinitely better Record. But, because of the pressures of a variety of work, I discover that I must be content with something of a synopsis that I had to dictate between telephone calls yesterday, and which Senators will find on their desks. So

I apologize for the meager material that I have presented to Senators in a formal fashion.

As Senators know, I do not read a manuscript very well; and I believe it is incumbent on me to search my heart and my mind and to talk topically as well as I can on the subject at hand.

At the outset, let me say that I shall support the treaty. It is no easy vote. In my office are probably 40,000 letters, and on my Capitol desk are petitions containing 10,000 names in opposition to the treaty. But I must equate those against the whole number of electors in my State. Moreover, I have admonished them over and over again that, regardless of the entreaties and presentations that have been made to me, I feel that I must follow a type of formula laid down by Edmund Burke, the great parliamentarian and Prime Minister of Britain, when he said it was his business to consult with his people, but it would be a betrayal of his conscience and a disservice to them if he failed to exercise his independent judgment.

So today my statement that I shall support the treaty is an exercise of my independent judgment based upon what I think is best for my country.

I have been drenched by all the correspondence and material that have come to my desk. I have gone over 100 pounds of pamphlets, brochures, letters, and all types of printed material that had a bearing upon the issue that is before the Senate.

I doubt whether at any other time—except three—in nearly 30 years of experience in the House and in the Senate, I have been so beset with the views and expressions of people everywhere.

I believe the first occasion was in 1940. If I am in error by a year, I shall have to ask my distinguished friend the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] whether that was the year of the "cash and carry" neutrality debate. I think it was. I remember the intensity of feeling which existed everywhere in the country and how emotionally and passionately people committed their feelings to paper. That was one occasion.

The second occasion was the dismissal of Douglas MacArthur. That happened in the Truman administration. The commentators and others had managed to excite the country. At that time I received about 200,000 letters.

The third time was when I was a member of the Committee on Government Operations of the Senate, the committee of which the late Senator McCarthy was the chairman. That committee conducted the trial. I was a member of the committee. On that occasion, the country was excited. Senators will remember that it was late at night when the Senate voted on the question. As the proceeding had been under the klieg lights and television cameras for 7 weeks, obviously it evoked a tremendous interest everywhere in the land. I believe there are still thousands of letters which I received, which have not been opened. My office staff indicated that more than 250,000 letters were received.

Senators can conceive what it is to have someone "smite you hip and thigh,"

in an angry mood, and say, "I demand a personal answer."

I do not know how one could answer people personally under those circumstances without resorting to the robot machines and other devices which are designed to diminish the workload upon the shoulders of Senators.

So I find, under all circumstances, that this is one of such occasions. On the other occasions—one under Franklin Roosevelt, one under Truman, and one under Eisenhower—we managed to survive, and we went our own way.

I believe perhaps Shakespeare was essentially correct when he said, in "Hamlet":

There's a divinity that shapes our ends,  
Rough-hew them how we will.

He might well have used the word "destiny." This could be, conceivably, a time of destiny for the country and for the world. Who am I to judge? Time and history will have to render that judgment.

But this is an important matter that engrosses our attention. I pray that I may be on the right side. I accept this assignment, and I accept the responsibility for my vote with a sense of gravity and concern.

Before the treaty was initialed, I was privileged to see a thermofax copy. I examined it as best I could. I rendered some offhand opinions at the time, some of which did not stand up. I saw them recited in an editorial the other day. One must expect that sort of thing in public life. But I do not let it bother me.

I said to my people, I said to the country publicly, and I said in the press gallery that I would take a hard look at the treaty. I said I would be diligent in examining its every implication, and that there would be only one standard by which to come to a vote, and that would be: What is best for the present and for the future of the United States of America, which has been so good to me as a citizen?

In pursuance of the assurance that I would take a hard look, I wanted to look at both sides, and I did look at both sides. I was concerned about a treaty with the Soviet Union. Who would not be?

I am no novice at the business of examining into the Soviet history and its record with respect to treaties. As a member of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary I have had abundant opportunity to look. I referred even to the old Army data known as "Alert No. 5: Soviet Treaty Violations."

I examined the violation of an understanding with the Georgian Republic, now absorbed into the Soviet Union, as early as 1920.

I examined into the trade agreement with Britain, when there was assurance against propaganda. It was violated, and the trade agreement with Britain fell.

In 1922 there was a treaty of assurance and friendship with the country of Czechoslovakia, yet later it was violated, and Czechoslovakia was forced to cede territory to the Soviet Union.



culminated in a daring thrust by Khrushchev to install missile bases in Cuba, at our very doorstep. In this reckless gambit, Khrushchev in effect was asking: "If her vital interests are challenged, is the United States really willing to risk all in a nuclear war?" President Kennedy's response, coming swift and sure, gave Khrushchev his answer. The world watched breathlessly as Kennedy ordered the Navy to turn back Russian ships on the high seas, even as he laid down his ultimatum that the Cuban bases must be dismantled and the Russian missiles withdrawn. Khrushchev had his answer, and he backed away under circumstances which surely inflicted the most serious reversal on the Communist cause since the end of the second war.

I suppose Khrushchev's question had to be asked—and answered—somewhere, sometime, if a turning point in the nuclear arms race was ever to be reached. The Russians had to know whether, in a showdown situation, we actually stood ready to suffer a full-scale nuclear exchange—whether, in effect, we would sooner choose to be dead than Red. Had Kennedy allowed the Russian missile bases to remain in Cuba, then Khrushchev would have known that he could win his points, one by one, through the threat of nuclear war—that he could bluff his way to world dominion. Under such circumstances, the Russian nuclear arsenal would have had utility, after all, in advancing the objectives of Soviet foreign policy. The Russians would doubtlessly have then intensified the nuclear arms race, and we would have no test ban treaty before us today.

So the tense and terrifying days of last October may well be recorded by historians of the future as a time of destiny for the whole human race, when the fortitude of an American President won for us another chance to harness the nuclear monster, or, as Kennedy himself has put it, to stuff the genie back in the bottle, while there is still time.

Those days of danger last October are like yesterday to me. I remember talking with the Secretary of State in the midst of the crisis. For days and nights he had not left his office, except to confer with the President. The awful strain of having set the United States on collision course with the Soviet Union was written in his face, and I thought of how lonely the President must be.

The agony dwelt also in the Kremlin. Those of us who serve on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have learned something of Khrushchev's ordeal during those tense hours, when the knot of war had to be untied even as events tightened it around both countries. The feat was accomplished in the 11th hour by men whose involvement will chasten them all their lives through.

So the stage was set for the President to renew the American effort to temper the nuclear arms race by another attempt to reach an agreement on a nuclear test ban. In June of this year, before leaving on his triumphal trip to Europe, Kennedy judged the time to be ripe for another overture to the Soviet Union. At American University, in a remarkable speech that I regard as the

highwater mark of his first term in office, the President addressed himself to the conscience and good sense of the American people, with these memorable words:

I have, therefore, chosen this time and this place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived—yet it is the most important topic on earth: world peace.

I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost 10 times the explosive force delivered by all of the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by the wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.

Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need to use them is essential to keeping the peace. But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles—which can only destroy and never create—is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace.

I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war—and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.

Some say that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament—and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitude—as individuals and as a nation—for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward—by examining his own attitude toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the cold war and toward freedom and peace here at home.

With a candor as refreshing as it is uncommon to men in high station, the President went on to say:

No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements—in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage.

Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique, among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War. At least 20 million lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and farms were burned or sacked. A third of the nation's territory, including nearly two-thirds of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland—a loss equivalent to the devastation of this country east of Chicago.

Today, should total war ever break out again—no matter how—our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironical but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all

we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours. And even in the cold war, which brings burdens and dangers to so many countries, including this Nation's closest allies—our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combating ignorance, poverty, and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget counter-weapons.

In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours—and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.

So, let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

Then the President focused upon the one place where a beginning might be made. Said he:

The one major area of these negotiations where the end is in sight—yet where a fresh start is badly needed—is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty—so near and yet so far—would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security—it would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.

In this great address at American University, the President correctly assessed the changing temper of the Kremlin strategists in the aftermath of their Cuban misadventure. His renewed invitation to Khrushchev to rethink things through was superbly timed. Logic is the same, whether pursued in English or Russian, and our refusal to yield to the Red missile threat in Cuba led to one inescapable conclusion: The issues between the United States and the Soviet Union could not be settled by nuclear intimidation.

Once this conclusion is reached, it becomes possible for both sides to consider ways for tempering the precarious risks inherent in what has been aptly described as the nuclear "balance of terror." A partial test ban treaty was a reachable first step in easing tensions and slowing down the feverish arms race. Once again, Kennedy offered it; this time, Khrushchev accepted it.

So we have before us a treaty which was negotiated—once the time was ripe—with extraordinary ease and speed. It has been examined with the utmost care by the members of the Senate Foreign Relations, Armed Forces, and Atomic

Energy Committees. We have heard expert testimony ranging from the technical military consequences of the treaty to its broadest implications in world politics and long-range cold war strategy. When all of the testimony is taken into account, the overwhelmingly consensus has supported the treaty. Our leading statesmen, the Chiefs of Staff of our Armed Forces, the directors of our intelligences and atomic energy programs, the great majority of our nuclear scientists, endorsed the treaty. It was the preponderant judgment of the expert witnesses called from many different fields of study, scientific, military, and political, that the risks to which we will be exposed without such a treaty far exceed the risks we assume with it. The case was strongly made that the best interests of the United States would be served by our ratification of this treaty without reservation.

There was, of course, testimony against the treaty, and there will be votes against it in the Senate. Not one among us lacks suspicion of the Russian Government, and it comes easily to reason that, since we and they are opposites, no adjustments between us are possible, that whatever is good for them must be bad for us.

If this is true, then cohabitation of this planet must ultimately give way to co-annihilation, tensions will grow ever greater as the spiraling arms race heightens the common danger, and there will be no escape from a fiery oblivion.

Yet is not this treaty itself a rebuttal to so dismal an outlook? Both sides have signed it, because each side has separately concluded that it serves its own interests to do so.

Decidedly, this does not mean that we believe we can now trust the Russians. No element of trust is involved in this treaty. It is limited to testing in those environments where we ourselves can detect any significant violations, without having to depend on any sort of Communist disclosure.

It has been said that we can expect the Russians to keep this treaty only so long as they find it in their interest to do so. I agree. And I would add that is all the longer we intend to keep it.

As the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has suggested the typical course of a sovereign nation, throughout the whole path of diplomatic history, is to keep a treaty only so long as it remains in its national interest to do so.

Both sides have carefully included an escape clause for this very purpose, drawn as broad as language can make it.

Article IV reads, in part:

Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

But there are good reasons to suppose that both the Soviet Union and the United States may well find it in their mutual interest to keep this treaty. The two nuclear giants bear the weight of certain common problems which this treaty should serve to lighten.

First, the two nuclear giants have most at stake in avoiding a nuclear war. The United States and Russia would be the principal targets of a nuclear exchange. Each has trained its missiles upon the launching sites, the cities, the industries of the other. The consequences we Americans would suffer were succinctly summarized by Mr. Sanford Gottlieb, who testified that our "homeland population and way of life would be pulverized, and the survivors would have the unenviable job of trying to refashion civilization out of the radioactive rubble. Freedom would not walk among the survivors." Khrushchev, on his part, has commented that the survivors would envy the dead. It is little solace, either for the Russians or for us, that Mao Tse-tung has already sensed that nuclear war today would be an Armageddon for the West, making the world safe for the Chinese. The treaty does not end the nuclear competition between us and the Soviet Union, but, as Walter Lippmann has observed, "limiting the experiments will remove the hysteria, the violence, and the poison from the competitive search for absolute supremacy," and thus should contribute toward the avoidance of a nuclear war.

Second, it is the two nuclear giants, as matters now stand, which have the most to lose by the spread of nuclear weapons technology to other countries. Each new nation added to the ranks of the nuclear powers holds up another match to the fuse of nuclear disaster for all. And if nuclear arsenals spread to nations with unstable governments, or come into the possession of regimes afflicted with a "rule or ruin" philosophy, then the risks to which we are now exposed would quickly multiply beyond calculation. This treaty alone will not prevent, but it will retard, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Third, the treaty, by imposing limitations on future tests, will slow down the development of ever more costly and complicated nuclear weapon systems—on both sides. Huge nuclear arms budgets have imposed a disproportionate burden upon the United States and Russia, as compared with our respective allies. It is now costing us, in this country, more than \$50 billion a year to maintain our Armed Forces, which is over half our total Federal budget. The cost has increased fivefold in the last 15 years. Testimony was given that it is likely to double again by 1970, if present trends continue. The Soviet Union, drawing upon lesser wealth, spends an even higher percentage of her national income for arms.

While the United States and Russia have been thus increasing their military budgets, their non-nuclear allies have been able to devote a bigger part of their wealth toward improving their economies. Within the Soviet bloc, countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland, and even Rumania, boast higher living standards and more consumer goods than Russia, a fact which has embarrassed Khrushchev during his recent visits. As for the United States, we still maintain the highest living standards in the world, but our country is beginning to fall behind some of our non-nuclear

allies in certain crucial respects. Since we are required to spend twice as much proportionately on military defense than our NATO partners in Western Europe, or Japan, our peacetime steel, shipbuilding, and machine tool industries are becoming increasingly obsolescent, in comparison with theirs, a factor which weakens our competitive position in the world market. More pertinent still, while 65 percent of our research and development funds go into weapons systems, only 15 percent of the research mark or yen in countries like Germany and Japan need be devoted to military purposes.

The staggering expense of the unrestricted nuclear arms race has forced us to give insufficient attention to the severe problems which are building up here at home—the problems of diminished industrial competitiveness, of automation, of education, of air and water pollution, of pockets of chronic unemployment, of mass transit, of urban renewal—all of which demand major new steps for solution.

And the same problem plagues the Soviet Union. Khrushchev has been unable to hide the increasing demand of the Russian people for a better life. I have seen enough of Russia with my own eyes to understand the popular appeal for a larger diversion of the nation's resources to consumer goods, food, clothing, and adequate housing. Their demands are far from met, and cannot be, unless the nuclear arms race can be slowed down, and resources diverted from the sword to the plow.

Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union, despite their profound differences, share one further inducement for keeping this treaty. They have a common need for ending the physical and psychological consequences of continued nuclear fallout. Internationally, this fallout has proved prejudicial to both countries. Other nations, with much justification, angrily demand: "By what right do you slowly poison the air we all must breathe?" Internally, the physical dangers of fallout are most severe in the United States and the Soviet Union themselves.

Senator BARTLETT of Alaska has called our attention several times to the high radiation levels in the areas inhabited by Eskimos in his State. Swedish scientists have also noted high radiation levels in the Arctic areas of Scandinavia; one would suppose that Soviet scientists are similarly concerned about their own Arctic regions.

But it is not only in the Arctic areas that high radiation levels are injurious to life. On June 7 of this year, the Federation of American Scientists issued a press release stating that:

The release of large amounts of radioactive debris comparable to that resulting from the 1962 U.S.S.R.-U.S. test series must be regarded as producing a definite increase in cancer mortality among children born within 1 to 2 years following that test series.

Articles in the Washington Post and New York Times of August 22 called attention to the findings of the St. Louis Committee on Nuclear Information headed by Dr. Eric Reiss, associate professor of Medicine at Washington Uni-

We are not the only victims. The Soviets have a special fondness for non-aggression pacts; they have gone into these treaties in a big way—with Poland, Finland, Rumania, the Baltic States, among others—and have violated nearly every one of them.

Mr. President, the goal of civilized people is peace. What is the best way to maintain peace?

The nuclear test ban treaty, submitted by the President to the Senate, is believed by many conscientious people to be in the interest of peace.

The treaty we are asked to ratify is, I believe, in the interest of every American if it does not endanger our people's safety or security.

Notwithstanding our justifiable distrust of the Soviets and our awareness of the limitations of the treaty, we are mindful of the grave danger of nuclear war and the advantage of keeping open any channel, however remote, for the avoidance of nuclear worldwide destruction.

I wish to insert another point right here.

One of the reasons most commonly offered for a nuclear test ban has to do with the danger of fallout contamination. Most of my mail favoring the test ban treaty has referred to fallout from atmospheric testing.

I regret to say I have not heard or read any conclusive testimony on this point. Regardless of how the vote on ratification goes, I think the responsible officials of the executive branch of the Government owe the public a frank and adequate answer on this point.

Either there is real danger from fallout incidental to atmospheric testing or there is not, and this point should be settled.

It is the position of many of our officials—and sincerely believed by a great majority of our citizens—that this treaty represents the first step made in 18 years toward permanent peace.

On the other hand, I am mindful of the fact that the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee has filed a report stating that the treaty will adversely affect the future quality of the Nation's arms and that it will result in serious military disadvantages.

Some witnesses questioned the safeguards to protect the national security of the United States.

On this point, I joined with colleagues on the Armed Services Committee in offering a resolution requesting that the administration furnish full information. The administration furnished the desired information. It gives us assurance that we can make the progress necessary to protect and maintain our deterrent within the limitations of the treaty. We are assured that the development of our arsenal will continue unhampered.

Incidentally, if we should fail to ratify, it would possibly shake the confidence of the 88 other nations who have signed, believing in our steadfastness of purpose and our devotion to peace.

There are two possible roads to peace. One is the proved road of strength and vigilance. The other is the unproved road of negotiation. We must travel

both roads. I feel that to forsake either path would be to court war and invite destruction.

Let us place our trust in the path of strength and our hope in the path of negotiation.

Mr. President, after careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that the treaty does not sacrifice anything vital to our security and does offer some hope. Therefore, I will vote for ratification—even though it must be with more hope than trust.

Mr. CHURCH obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, with the understanding that he will not lose his right to the floor?

Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield to the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, for the purpose of submitting a request to the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, yesterday the leadership, in conformity with the rules of the Senate, endeavored to move to the next step in the consideration of the resolution of ratification. This is the normal procedure. However, at the request of the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], who expressed no opposition whatever to the procedure which the leadership was attempting to follow, we agreed with him to put it over until today.

Under the rules of the Senate the procedural situation is such that reservations, interpretations, and understandings with respect to the treaty are not in order at this stage of the proceedings. At this time only actual amendments to the language of the treaty itself may be offered. In the past, the traditional method by which the Senate expressed its reservation to, or its understanding of, the meaning of the treaty was by adding such reservation or understanding to the resolution of ratification. This is the proper procedure and the one which the leadership understands is intended to be followed now. I therefore now ask unanimous consent that the treaty be considered as having passed through the several parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification. The granting of this request, if it is granted, will not deny any Senator the right to speak on any part of the treaty, the treaty as a whole, or for that matter on any other subject. The only effect procedurally will be to foreclose the offering of amendments and to allow the offering of proposed reservations and understandings.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. THURMOND. Reserving the right to object, amendments may be offered. I would not wish that the Senate be bound

by such an agreement. Therefore, I object.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I say to the Senator from South Carolina that this is an action which can be taken at any time. I would hope that the Senator, in his understanding of the situation, would understand also the position in which the leadership finds itself. We are not trying to rush the treaty to completion. We are making it as easy as possible for every Senator to make his views known, either for or against the proposed treaty. It is the usual procedure which we are requesting at this time, and only the usual procedure. It will not preclude the offering of reservations or understandings by any Senator who wishes to do so. To the best of the knowledge of the leadership—the combined leadership—no amendments are at the desk, nor has the leadership been informed of any amendments to be considered. The Senate cannot consider reservations or understandings until this step has been taken.

Mr. THURMOND. I reassert my desire to cooperate with the leadership in every way I can. This is an important subject. I see no need to foreclose the question of amendments, if it is decided that amendments should be offered. I shall have to insist on my objection.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator from South Carolina himself have any amendments he wishes to offer? The reason I ask is that we know of no amendments.

Mr. THURMOND. I do not care to give a final answer to that question at this time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from Idaho for yielding.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, a treaty in which all signatories have agreed to refrain from nuclear testing in the air, underwater, and in outer space, has finally come before us for ratification. It is here because the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union have at last recognized that it may be better to try to halt the nuclear arms race than to try to win it.

For years we have known in our bones that there was no way to win this race. The longer it has gone on, the closer both sides have come to nuclear parity. As our respective atomic stockpiles have grown more immense, the more certain it has become that it will be suicidal to use them. The combined American and Russian nuclear arsenals are now estimated to contain an explosive power of some 60 billion tons of TNT—enough to put a 20-ton bomb at the head of every human being on earth.

Small wonder that the President has said:

Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons—10 million times more powerful than anything the



world has every seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth—is a source of horror, and discord, and distrust. Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes—for disarmament must be a part of any final settlement. And men may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness—for in a spiralling arms race, a nation's security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase.

We know this treaty is only the first step on the long, uncertain journey toward arms control. Many steps must follow if we are ever to grope our way out from under the somber shadow of the mushroom cloud. But the treaty represents our first chance to embark upon the journey since the burst of that fateful fireball above Hiroshima 18 years ago. It may be a small step, and it comes very late, but it proffers some hope of being the commencement of that long pilgrimage to avert what the President has aptly described as "the world's slide toward final annihilation."

As the first nation to have developed the atomic bomb, we have always felt a special responsibility for the control of such weapons. Less than a year after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States offered its original plan for the internationalization of atomic energy. Bernard Baruch, as spokesman for President Truman, appeared before the United Nations in support of the American proposal, saying:

We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business. Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of fear. Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect world peace or world destruction.

Tragically, our proposal was rejected by a suspicious Stalin who believed, with his generals, that Russia could never be secure without first securing the bomb. Thus began the nuclear arms race. Never has a competition occurred more frightening or more futile. Never have the energies of two great nations been so largely absorbed in so frantic a pursuit of the Devil's arts.

At first, we followed the grim statistics of the race with horrified fascination. Warheads were soon perfected that were 10 to 20 times as powerful as the bomb which inflicted 140,000 casualties on Hiroshima. But this was only the beginning. As fusion followed fission, hydrogen weapons were added to the American and Russian arsenals which were hundreds—even thousands—of times more powerful still. To our disbelief, we learned there were no upper limits to the size of the explosions that could be contrived.

New words were needed to measure the forces being released in the testing—kilotons, megatons, the very terms began to turn sour on our tongues. And as the years passed, as the costs mounted ever higher, as our weapons systems became ever more sophisticated, as our missilemen went underwater and underground, it became increasingly evident that national defense, in the sense of shielding our homeland and our way of life, had gone the way of the musket and

the powderhorn. The term itself has nearly disappeared from the lexicon of contemporary military usage. Against nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, we have no defense. Instead, we maintain an enormous deterrent which alone may survive a full-scale nuclear attack upon us. Its purpose is not to defend, but to avenge. The frenzied search for national security through nuclear armament has failed.

Indeed, it was foredoomed from the outset. Instinctively, we have known this from the time we first detonated the hydrogen weapon that sank an island in the Pacific. In those days it was Senator Brien McMahon, of Connecticut, the chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, who was impelled to introduce a resolution concerning "the overriding problem of our time—how to stop the armaments race and establish a just peace." In sponsoring this resolution, McMahon was joined by several men who are still Members of the Senate—Senator FULBRIGHT, of Arkansas; Senator SPARKMAN, of Alabama; Senator MAGNUSON, of Washington; Senator MORSE, of Oregon; and Senator, then Representative, JACKSON, of Washington. The stirring summation of one of McMahon's addresses should suffice to show the depth of his concern, even then, that the world must find a way to deal with the split atom before the atom split the world. He said:

Mr. President, the clock is ticking, ticking, and with each swing of the pendulum the time to save civilization grows shorter. When shall we get about this business? Now, or when Russia and the United States glower at one another from atop competing stacks of hydrogen bombs. Senators, destiny will not grant us the gift of indifference. If we do not act, the atom will.

If we do not act, we may be profaned forever by the inheritors of a ravished planet. We will be reviled, not as fools—even a fool can sense the massive danger. We will be reviled as cowards—and rightly, for only a coward can flee the awesome facts which command us to act with fortitude.

But the United States and the Soviet Union were too caught up in the momentum of their grisly competition to heed McMahon's warnings. With little interruption, the clock has continued to tick away for the 13 years that followed until we found ourselves—true to his prediction—glowering at one another from atop our respective hydrogen stockpiles, in the course of the two terrible showdowns of 1962—one over Berlin and the other over Cuba.

An implacable fate has not granted us the gift of indifference. What American parent in the dark hours of the Berlin confrontation or the Cuban missile crisis failed to look at his children and shudder at the thought of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war? As we were forced to peer over the brink of the abyss where is a sane and honest man who would deny that we were not "the slaves of fear?" And who among us would contend that the Russians felt no panic? However, wrongminded we believe them to be, the Russians are human, too.

How close are we today to the end of the rope? No one can say for sure. If other showdowns lie ahead, we must face them bravely, and pray that nuclear

holocaust is averted. But sure it is that we cannot slide down the rope indefinitely. Somewhere it has a frazzled end which will drop us into a witchfire of incredible destruction. This treaty is one pull back on the rope, the first pull of a long climb which could lead to a safer and saner world.

From Truman forward, our Presidents have sensed the futility of continued, unrestricted testing, and our need to somehow temper and then to harness the nuclear arms race itself. Less than 3 months after President Eisenhower took office in 1953, he renewed the American offer for international control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons. In 1958, Eisenhower ordered a cessation of this country's nuclear testing, and his administration, in cooperation with the British Government, commenced negotiations with the Soviet Union in an attempt to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban, applicable to all environments, including underground testing.

Perhaps the effort was premature; perhaps the objective sought was too ambitious for the times. The inclusion of underground testing greatly complicated the problem of working out an adequate system of inspection and control. We contended, rightly I think, that seismographs alone could not always distinguish between certain kinds of underground nuclear explosions and earthquakes, and that onsite inspections of suspicious events would therefore be required, if covert violations of the proposed treaty were to be safeguarded against. The Russians contended that a static control system would suffice, and that our motive in demanding roving inspections was actually a guise to permit hostile reconnaissance and espionage within the Soviet Union. On this issue, the negotiations dragged on inconclusively for many months.

Thinking it impossible, at that time, to obtain Russian consent to onsite inspections, which were in my view indispensable to any workable comprehensive treaty, I myself proposed on the floor of the Senate, in April of 1959, that the United States seek a limited test ban agreement to stop further nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

Later that year, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan joined in offering Khrushchev a limited ban on atmospheric tests up to an altitude of 50 kilometers. In 1961, President Kennedy, again with Macmillan, proposed a ban on atmospheric tests. Both of these proposals were rejected by the Soviet Government as insufficient.

All of us know the sorry story of how the stalemated negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty ended in dismal failure; we recall how the Soviet Union, after quiet preparations, suddenly resumed testing on a most extensive scale, forcing the United States to do likewise. We remember, too, how the testing was accompanied by a new round of bellicose speechmaking in the Soviet Union, coupled with a hardening of Russian attitudes on every cold war front. And we shall never forget how the era

whims and prejudices of uninformed public opinion on such matters as foreign aid.

Senator FULBRIGHT did not spell out what he had in mind in recommending enhancement of Presidential authority in foreign affairs but certainly one of the steps required would be modification of the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds approving vote by the Senate for ratification of a treaty with other powers.

"The prospect is a disagreeable and perhaps a dangerous one, but the alternative is immobility and paralysis of national policy in a revolutionary world, which can only lead to consequences immeasurably more disagreeable and dangerous," he said.

Senator FULBRIGHT confined his reform proposals to the field of foreign policy. Being an influential committee chairman and being possessed of ample seniority, he found no reason to be critical of congressional handling of homefront problems.

"In domestic matters, it seems to me, the Congress is as well qualified to shape policy as the Executive, and in some respects more so because of the freedom of at least some Members from the particular electoral pressures that operate on the President," he said.

On this point Senator FULBRIGHT came into direct disagreement with another congressional participant in that symposium—Senator JOSEPH S. CLARK, Democrat, of Pennsylvania.

Senator CLARK, a former mayor of Philadelphia, pointed an accusing finger at Congress, the State legislatures and city councils as "the greatest menace to the successful operation of the democratic process."

He painted a dismal picture of what goes on in the Nation's Legislative Chambers. There, he said, is "where the vested interest lobbies run riot, where conflict of interest rides unchecked, where demagoguery knows few bounds, where political lag keeps needed action a generation behind the times, where ignorance is often at a premium and wisdom at a discount, where the evil influence of arrogant and corrupt political machines ignores most successfully the public interest, where the lust for patronage and favors for the faithful do the greatest damage to the public interest."

Those are strong words and they did not endear Senator CLARK to his colleagues in Congress. Nor did the reforms he urged to correct the legislative evils he sees. These are:

Strengthening the executive at the expense of the legislative branch. Specifically he proposed 4-year terms for Members of both the House and Senate so that they all would be elected in presidential campaign years and thus committed to the national platform.

Amendment of the Constitution to allow the President to make Executive appointments without Senate confirmation, doing away with "the need to satisfy legislative parochialism."

Election of congressional committee chairman by secret ballot rather than by seniority.

Outlawing of delaying tactics such as the filibuster and the bottling up of proposed legislation in committee. He would require that all bills sent to the Capitol by the White House be brought to a vote on their merits regardless of committee action.

Fair reapportionment of congressional and State legislative districts in all States.

Stronger laws governing campaign contributions, including tax inducements to small contributors.

Another entry in the national debate over what's wrong in Washington came from the political scientist and author, James MacGregor Burns, in his recent book, "The Deadlock of Democracy—Four-Party Politics in America."

He finds both Democrats and Republicans guilty of misrepresenting themselves.

It is Professor Burns' contention that actually there are two Republican and two Democratic Parties. Each, he says, confuses and deceives the public by maintaining separate presidential and congressional wings which stand apart like separate sovereign powers.

At each national convention in recent years, he points out, the GOP has nominated a political moderate who ran on a platform with broad appeal to moderates and independents as well as conservatives.

Once those presidential elections are over, he writes, control of Republican policy has tended to shift back to the standpoint, conservative leadership of the party's conservative wing, currently personified by such men as House Minority Leader CHARLES A. HALECK, Senate Minority Leader EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, and Senator BARRY M. GOLDWATER.

It is much the same on the Democratic side, his argument goes. The convention nominates a John F. Kennedy, an Adlai E. Stevenson or a Harry S. Truman to run on a national liberal platform of glowing promises.

Then, when the tumult of the campaign dies down, the congressional wing of the party resumes its old stand on the right under the brass-knuckle leadership of such Democratic moguls as Virginians Senator HARRY F. BYRD and Representative HOWARD W. SMITH, boss of the House Rules Committee.

Professor Burns lays the blame for drift and delay in present-day Government to what he calls the four-party system "that compels government by consensus and coalition rather than a two-party system that allows the winning party to govern and the losers to oppose."

He would do away with the congressional wings of the two parties by absorbing them into the national parties, largely through most of the congressional reforms proposed by Senator CLARK.

He nominates for oblivion the seniority system in Congress, minority devices such as the Rules Committee veto, the filibuster, malapportionment and one-party districts.

One of the most penetrating of the recent discussions of Government reform and of the declining prestige of Congress came from a freshman Member of the House, Representative ROBERT TAFT, JR., in an address at the American Bar Association convention in Chicago this month.

Mr. TAFT told his fellow lawyers that Congress is the weak link in the Federal Government and that it must be revitalized if there is to be a halt to the mounting assumption of power by the executive and judicial branches at the expense of the legislative branch and of State and local governments.

Unlike his late father, Mr. TAFT looks for no resurgence of States rights. He defined the Federal system as "a governmental organization which permits continued existence of lesser subdivisions for limited purposes" and said recent Supreme Court decisions have made argument over States rights mors and more academic.

Some of the reform suggestions Mr. TAFT threw out at the bar convention were familiar. Others are new and bold.

For instance, he proposed a voluntary redrawing of State boundaries to relate them to the "economic and practical realities and necessities" of modern industrial civilization.

This revision of State lines is particularly desirable for coping with the increasing complexities and contradictions involved in large multi-State metropolitan areas, he said.

Among the other reforms suggested by Mr. TAFT were:

Elimination of the electoral college system to head off a possible fiasco in a presidential election.

Solving the legislative reapportionment problem by taking it out of the hands of the courts and enacting a constitutional amendment defining clearly the requirements for guaranteeing the principle of representative government.

Changing the process of amending the Constitution by providing for ratification by a two-thirds vote of the people of two-thirds of the States as well as by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress. This limitation of the power of the State legislatures would offer "more flexibility" to the process, he said.

Action by State and local governments to eliminate duplication of governmental units and to eliminate the "balkanization" of metropolitan areas by county and State lines.

A shift in the Federal tax base to give the States and local government more revenue to deal with health, education, welfare, and other such programs.

Turning to the question of the House, Mr. TAFT traced most of its ineptitude to the wide dispersion of leadership on both the majority and minority sides and took his stand with those who favor trimming the powers of the Rules Committee.

"Because of the power of the Rules Committee, along with the seniority feature in connection with committees, the selection of committee chairman and the right of committee chairmen to schedule or refuse to schedule legislation for hearing, the centers of power within the parties in Congress are multiple, with no one being in a position to direct even the procedural aspects of the legislative body," he said. Mr. TAFT suggested the undoing of the 1960 reform which stripped the Speaker of the House—then Joseph G. (Uncle Joe) Cannon—of many of his arbitrary powers.

He said that reform was made at a time when the legislative dominated the executive branch and that now with the executive firmly in the saddle and Congress the underdog, the time has come to build up the power of the speaker and centralize the sources of procedural power within the two parties.

Discussions about the shortcomings of the Federal Government usually wind up with the finger of accusation pointed at Congress.

On the 535 Members of the House and Senate falls the responsibility of overseeing the vast Federal establishment of nearly 2.5 million employees and 2,300 executive departments, agencies, offices, and bureaus.

They are called upon to review and authorize Federal spending at a rate approaching \$100 billion a year and to pass upon the programs submitted by the White House.

In trying to cope with this formidable burden of work, the legislative branch is employing substantially the same loose organization and the same ivy-covered ground rules it developed by stops and starts between 1789 and the outbreak of World War I.

Taking their cue from the authors of the Constitution, successive generations of congressional leaders have erected their own elaborate system of checks and balances which enables the minority to frustrate the majority and clog the legislative machinery.

Attempts to grease the wheels of Congress have been frequent in the past. The last serious effort came in the Reorganization Act of 1946 passed after the legislators were warned by a blue-ribbon committee of the American Political Science Association that it "must modernize its machinery and methods to fit modern conditions if it is to keep the pace with a greatly enlarged and active executive branch."

The 1946 act, however, failed to produce any lasting changes beyond a boost in congressional salaries. It did reduce the number of standing committees from 81 to 34, but that cut eventually was nullified by the creation of equally large numbers of standing subcommittees.

Now, 17 years later, growing public distaste for "do-nothing" congresses is applying

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pressure for a new stab at rewriting some of the archaic rules of procedure.

Proposals to name a Joint House-Senate reform study group to draw up reorganization recommendations are now resting in committee in both houses, backed by bipartisan groups of liberals.

The towering logjam of unfinished business, mounting since early January, probably will prohibit action on any reform committee resolution this year, but the hand-writing is on the wall and it will come eventually.

Disclosures of unethical conduct by Congressmen, including nepotism, padded pay-rolls, junketing, conflicts of interest, to say nothing of the extravagance displayed in the building of the stately new House Office Building, have aroused the ire of at least some of the Nation's voters.

It is likely that there will be a reform group named next year but the results are uncertain. The only thing sure about a reorganization program is that it is likely to include a congressional pay increase.

In the past, senior Members have been able to consistently beat down efforts to make the House Rules Committee a conduit rather than a blockade against pending legislation; and set a time limit on debate in the Senate; to delegate authority for disposing of some of the trivia that now takes up valuable time, or to write a new code of ethics for Congressmen.

Reform is overdue. Reform is inevitable. But before it can come, it appears that there will have to be a landslide election to give one or the other of the two parties enough new members and the overwhelming majority needed to rout the entrenched senior members and ram through a meaningful reform program.

[From the Toledo (Ohio) Blade, Aug. 25, 1963]

#### CALL TO REFORM

The crisis in government described on this page is neither unprecedented nor revolutionary. The history of government can be recorded as one crisis after another, each defined in its own debate and possessed of its own timeliness.

Usually these crises—the run-of-the-mill type, so to speak—center upon specific issues or proposals: a tariff policy, a tax bill, a treaty. What sets today's debate apart is that it probes to the vitals of the governmental system itself, the process by which other crises are resolved.

Even this aspect of the crisis discussed here is not unprecedented. But its crucial nature is the more emphasized by the fact that similar crises-in-depth have occurred previously only when the Nation's very existence was at stake, when the alternatives were to change or to die. Thus the Founding Fathers threw out the Articles of Confederation in 1787 to convert 13 rival entities into a viable sovereignty, and the Civil War was fought to free the national impulse to expand from the restraining bonds of provincialism.

The urgency of the current crisis is further highlighted by the fact that those who recognize and define it are not all detached bystanders. With the exception of Professor Burns, each of the men whose views are outlined here is involved in the governmental process. Together, they represent a broad range of geographic, economic, social, and political interests.

It is significant that none of these men belong to the school of skeptics which sees the crisis as heralding the collapse of American democracy. All are confident that the United States can continue to build on its present constitutional foundation. That they find some of the superstructure in dire need of renovation actually testifies to their faith. Just as the superstructure they condemn was originally erected to replace an

earlier outworn one, so they want now to remodel the procedures and powers of government to give new vitality to the old framework.

The crisis, then, is one of dynamic politics. This can be seen in the fact that so much of today's controversy is sparked by decisions of the Supreme Court. As Justice Harlan told the American Bar Association this month, it is a "serious mischief" to conclude that "all deficiencies in our society which have failed of correction by other means should find a cure in the courts." But resort to the courts is inevitable when normal political methods become so fossilized that they deny the Negro the opportunity to obtain his rights, or deprive millions of citizens of fair representation in their State and National legislatures.

The 1963 crisis in American Government marks another turning point in our development. History teaches us that there is no cause for despair. But it also teaches us that it could be disastrous to ignore the summons to reform.

#### TRIBUTE TO SENATOR PEARSON FOR HIS SPEECH ON CUBA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last week I was privileged to hear a part of the fine speech on Cuba delivered by the distinguished junior Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON]. Unfortunately, I was called from the Chamber before I could make any comment on his speech. So I take this opportunity to compliment and commend him for the forward-looking ideas he expressed in the speech he delivered on that occasion.

I am impressed by the fact that he has considered the possibilities as to what might be done in the future when Cuba once again is free. He also emphasized the part the Organization of American States should take in planning for this possibility, which without question will become a fact. He then enumerated five essential elements of a free society which should be considered by this inter-American organization.

In his conclusion, he outlined three reasons why we should now prepare for the rehabilitation of Cuba; and he went into some detail in explaining them.

Toward the end of this speech he made this pertinent comment:

Mr. President, I have tried to see beyond the curve of the horizon, to the day when Cuba once again will be free.

I wish to take this occasion to compliment the distinguished junior Senator from Kansas for making a distinct contribution to our understanding of the Cuban problem, and also for attempting—as he stated so succinctly—to see beyond the curve of the horizon, into the future, and to make plans accordingly.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Montana yield briefly to me, to enable me to comment on that subject?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am glad to yield. Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, it was my privilege also to be seated in this Chamber throughout the great speech the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] made last week.

I desire to pay my respect to the junior Senator from Kansas. Indeed, I feel that by his speech, he made a great contribution, and he deserves the congratu-

lations of all Senators for the leadership he has demonstrated so soon after becoming a Member of the Senate.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Has morning business been concluded?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

#### THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, after weeks of studying the issue of the nuclear test ban treaty, as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee—having listened to testimony before our committee and having read the lengthy arguments on both sides—I have come to the conclusion that it is in the best interest of the American people to ratify the treaty.

In doing so, I am laboring under no illusions about the character of the chief cosigner, the Soviets, or about the limitations of the treaty. It is a matter of balancing the risks.

I favor our making every possible effort to achieve agreements on nuclear testing—and on disarmament and peace—with the Soviets so long as these agreements incorporate adequate safeguards.

We in the Senate will ratify the nuclear test ban treaty without any illusions as to its limitations. We know full well that the leopard has not changed his spots.

Even during the final negotiations at Moscow, Khrushchev joined in a public declaration calling for the "liberation of South Korea" from the U.S. "imperialists." No doubt, the Soviets still intend to "bury" us.

As President Kennedy said in his address to the Nation on July 26:

Nations cannot afford in these matters to rely simply on the good faith of their adversaries.

We are not deceiving ourselves about our adversary. Neither are we deceiving ourselves about this treaty. It is not the millennium, as the President said.

And, as he said further, it does not "mean an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it will not halt the production of nuclear weapons; it will not resolve all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forgo their ambitions."

Let me say, further, that I firmly believe that the Soviets will not hesitate to break this treaty when it serves their purpose to do so. We are fully aware of Russia's record of broken agreements.

I have been furnished with some interesting statistics on our past negotiations with the Soviets. I have no reason to doubt these figures. During the last 25 years, the United States has had 3,400 meetings with the Soviets—including Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, Panmunjom, and Geneva. The negotiators spoke 106 million words—100 volumes. All this talk led to 52 major agreements, and the Soviets have broken 50 of them.